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Abstract 
Subjective judgments about retrieval phenomenologies (remember/know) and memory strength 
(confidence) are often used in dual-process research to separate recollective from nonrecollective 
retrieval.  Although such methods provide process-level explanations of the effects of list length 
and word frequency on recognition, whether the same applies to free recall is unknown.  I 
compared subjective and objective methods of measuring dual processes and investigated their 
process-level explanations of the effects of list length and word frequency on free recall.  Ninety-
five undergraduates received multiple study-test trials and made retrospective judgments about 
items recalled on the last trial.  A dual-retrieval Markov chain was used to quantify recollective 
and nonrecollective retrieval from subjects’ recall performance rather than their metacognitive 
judgments to recalled items.  In free recall, list length affected both recollective and 
nonrecollective retrieval, whereas word frequency only affected recollective retrieval.  In 
addition, although remember judgments and correct source identification correlated with an 
objective measure of recollective retrieval (direct access), high confidence did not and it was 
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Metacognitive judgments about memory can be separated into prospective judgments 
(e.g., ease of learning, judgments of learning, and feelings of knowing) and retrospective 
judgments (e.g., confidence judgments, and judgments of remembering and knowing).  This 
study addressed the latter form of judgment.  Specifically, the aim of the present study was to 
investigate the relationship between memory and retrospective metamemory judgments, which is 
motivated by applied as well as theoretical considerations.  On the applied side, retrospective 
judgments about memory are often used in eyewitness identification procedures in the United 
States (Wells et al., 1998; Keast, Brewer, & Wells, 2007), predicated on the idea that such 
judgments can provide reliable information about memory accuracy.  Eyewitnesses to crime 
scenes, for instance, are often asked by law enforcement officers to identify a culprit in a lineup 
and to make a confidence judgment about their decision.  In the same vein, assessments of the 
credibility of an eyewitness’ testimony are often influenced by changes in the degree of certainty 
about the information reported (Brewer & Burke, 2002; Whitley & Greenberg, 1986).  On the 
theoretical side, retrospective judgments about memory play a key role in many theories and 
measurement models of memory.  In the recognition memory literature, for instance, confidence 
judgments are often assumed to be a proxy of memory strength (e.g., Wixted, 2007; Yonelinas, 
1999).  Similarly, remember/know judgments and source judgments  are often used on the 
assumption that they can distinguish between different types of retrieval processes, such as 
recollection and familiarity (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995), or between different memory systems, 
such as episodic and semantic (Tulving, 1985). 
However, the extent to which retrospective metamemory judgments tap the assumed 
theoretical operations is controversial (Strack & Förster, 1995; Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 
1979).  Confidence judgments about recall accuracy have been shown to be influenced by 
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several factors other than memory strength, such as the amount of information retrieved (Koriat, 
Lichtenstein, & Fischnoff, 1980), the vividness of the information recalled (Robinson & Johnson, 
1996), the degree of familiarity with an item’s theme (Chandler, 1994), subjects’ chronological 
age (Koriat & Ackerman, 2011), and the amount of time to provide a response to a question 
(Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Nelson et al., 1990).  In connection with that, Wells, Rydell, and 
Seelau (1993) showed that confidence in identification accuracy can be influenced by the degree 
to which members of a lineup fit the culprit’s description, regardless of actual accuracy in 
identification.  Subjects in Wells et al.’s experiment witnessed a staged theft and were then asked 
to give a description of the culprit.  Next, subjects were presented with one of three photospread 
conditions in which they were asked to say whether the culprit was present in the photospread or 
not and to rate their confidence in their judgment.  In the mismatch-description condition, 
innocent members of the lineup violated at least one major feature of the culprit’s description 
reported by the subject.  In the resemble-culprit condition, innocent members of the lineup 
resembled the culprit in several features.  In the match-description condition, none of the 
innocent members of the lineup violated the culprit’s description reported by the subject.  
Regardless of whether the identification was true or false, confidence in identification accuracy 
decreased from the mismatch-description condition to both the resemble-culprit condition and 
the match-description condition.  
In fact, the notion that people have direct access to the strength of memory traces, even of 
memories not consciously available (Hart, 1967), has received little support in the metacognition 
literature (for a review, see Schwartz, Benjamin, & Bjork, 1997).  Benjamin, Bjork, and 
Schwartz (1998), for example, showed that subjects’ prediction about future memory 
performance can be inversely related to memory strength under certain conditions.  In their 
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experiment, subjects were instructed to answer twenty general-knowledge questions such as 
“what is the name of the horse-like animal with black and white stripes?”.  After each answer, 
subjects were instructed to give the probability that they would be able to free recall the answer 
again in twenty minutes.  Ten minutes later, subjects performed a free recall test for the answers 
provided in the first part of the experiment (e.g., zebra), which revealed two main results, both 
shown in Figure 1.  First, answers to general knowledge questions that took a long time to output 
in the beginning of the experiment (hard answers) were better recalled than the ones that were 
promptly output (easy answers), a finding that was interpreted as the result of deeper encoding of 
hard answers relative to easy answers.  More specifically, the increased time searching in 
semantic memory for answers to hard questions enhanced the strength of the episodic traces of 
those answers.  Consequently, if the direct access hypothesis is correct, predicted recall 
performance should follow the same direction as actual recall performance.  However, the 
second result showed the exact opposite pattern, namely predicted recall decreased from easy to 
hard answers.   
Retrospective Judgments about Memory 
Despite the massive evidence that metamemory judgments are influenced by factors other 
than memory itself (Koriat, 2002; Nelson & Narens, 1990), recognition and recall are often 
supplemented by retrospective judgments about memory as a means of quantifying latent 
memory operations (Tulving, 1985; Wixted, 2007; Yonelinas, 1994, 1999).  Next, we describe 
three such retrospective judgments about memory: remember/know, confidence, and source 
judgments.   
Judgments of remembering and knowing 
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Tulving’s (1985) remember/know procedure was an early attempt to characterize and to 
measure distinct phenomenologies that are often induced by retrieval, such as when 
remembering the name of a wine drank yesterday is followed by a vivid recollection of its label 
and bottle, as opposed to remembering the name of it without such experience.  In this procedure, 
subjects study a list of items and then perform a recall or recognition test.  In an old/new 
recognition test, old decisions to test probes are supplemented by judgments of remembering and 
knowing, while in a recall test, remember/know judgments are made as items are output or after 
recall of all items.  “Remember” judgments are associated with an autonoetic state of conscious 
awareness about an item’s previous occurrence, in which its features are consciously re-
experienced during retrieval.  In the previous example, a remember judgment would characterize 
the retrieval of a wine’s name accompanied by recollection of its label and bottle.  “Know” 
judgments, on the other hand, are associated with a noetic state of conscious awareness about an 
item’s previous occurrence, in which subjects have knowledge about its occurrence but do not 
consciously re-experience it during retrieval (e.g., retrieval of the wine’s name without 
recollecting any distinctive feature of it or the context in which it was seen).  Therefore, subjects’ 
responses on both recognition and recall tests can be partitioned into “remembered” and 
“known” responses, or recollective and nonrecollective retrieval, respectively.  In two 
experiments, Tulving found that (a) free recall of a list of 27 names was more often 
“remembered” than “known” (88% of the items recalled received a remember judgment), (b) 
remember judgments decreased after long as opposed to short delays between study and test (the 
bias-corrected rate of remember judgments for items recognized as old was 38% immediately 
after study and 15% after a seven-day delay), and (c) confidence in recognition response was 
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higher for “remembered” items than for “known” items (the average confidence rating on a 3-
point confidence scale for “remembered” items was 2.7, while for “known” items it was 2.1). 
In its original conception, the two states of consciousness that support judgments of 
remembering and knowing were assumed to be closely connected to episodic and semantic 
memory, respectively.  Of late, however, remember/know judgments have been assumed to 
underlie different memory processes, such as recollection and familiarity (Yonelinas, 1994, 
2001).  The validity of the latter mapping, however, has been controversial (Donaldson, 1996; 
Dunn, 2004, 2008).  In the recognition memory literature, Donaldson (1996) argued that 
remember/know data can be accommodated by a one-process signal detection model that allows 
participants to set different decision criteria for remember and know responses, as opposed to 
using different retrieval processes, thus casting doubt on the ability of remember/know 
judgments to separate recollective from nonrecollective retrieval.   
Interestingly, although the recollective experience that characterizes remember judgments 
seems to be indicative of an event’s past occurrence, this idea has not received support.  Multiple 
experiments have shown that recollective experiences can occur even during retrieval of 
memories about events that have never happened (Brainerd, Payne, Wright, & Reyna, 2003; 
Geraci & McCabe, 2006; McCabe, Roediger, McDaniel, & Balota, 2009; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995).  Subjects in Roediger and McDermott’s (1995) experiment studied lists of 
semantically associated words (e.g., note, sound, piano, sing) and then performed an old/new 
recognition test, which was composed of targets (sound), new related words (music), and new 
unrelated words (apple), supplemented by judgments of remembering and knowing.  The results 
showed that remember judgments occurred as often for targets (the bias-corrected rate was equal 
to 39%) as for new related words (35%).   
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Therefore, although remember judgments capture a particular retrieval phenomenology, 
such experience seems to be neither diagnostic of memory accuracy nor of the type of underlying 
memory representation.  The generality of this conclusion, however, is weakened by the fact that 
it relies largely upon findings from recognition memory studies.  Even though the 
remember/know procedure was also initially used in paradigms other than recognition (e.g., free 
and cued recall) (Tulving, 1985), its subsequent use has been almost exclusively with 
recognition—the few exceptions include the studies conducted by Hamilton and Rajaram (2003) 
and McDermott (2006).  From a theoretical perspective, this represents a major restriction as the 
retrieval operations that take place during recognition are not necessarily the same as the ones 
that operate in recall (Crowder, 1976; Brainerd & Reyna, 2010).  The extent to which judgments 
of remembering and knowing tap recollective and nonrecollective processes in recall, 
respectively, is largely unknown because previous studies have not addressed this issue.  
Confidence judgments 
Retrospective confidence judgment is another type of metamemory judgment that has 
figured in the memory literature.  In contrast to remember/know judgments, confidence 
judgments have been used in psychological research for more than a century (Bernbach, 1967; 
Egan, 1959; Fullerton & Cattell, 1892; Henmon, 1911; Hollingworth, 1913).  But similar to 
remember/know judgments, confidence was initially used as a method of quantifying subjects’ 
introspection about their mental processes (Metcalf, 1917).   
In a standard old/new recognition test supplemented by confidence judgments, subjects 
are presented with a set of items (e.g., tea, book, clock, and table) and then are asked to rate old 
items (book, table) and new ones (green, monkey) on a old/new confidence scale (e.g., on a 6-
point scale, 1 = sure new, ..., 6 = sure old).  In a free recall experiment, subjects usually rate their 
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confidence about their response (i.e., whether the response is correct or incorrect) (e.g., on a 6-
point scale, 1 = sure incorrect, ..., 6 = sure correct) rather than their confidence about the episodic 
state of an item (i.e., whether it is old or new), as in the recognition example.  However, although 
retrospective confidence judgments about subjects’ response can also be made in old/new 
recognition experiments (e.g., How confident you are about your old/new decision?, 1 = not 
confident at all, 2 = moderately confident, 3 = very confident), such distinction has not always 
been acknowledged (Banks, 1970; Baranski & Petrusic, 1998; Fullerton & Cattell, 1892; Rabin 
& Cain, 1984; but see Higham, Perfect, & Bruno, 2009) and has led to confusion in the past 
(Healy & Jones, 1973; Lockhart & Murdock, 1970).  
Confidence as a proxy for memory strength.  In theories that draw upon signal 
detection analogies (Mickes, Hwe, Wais, & Wixted, 2011; Yonelinas, 1994; Wixted, 2007), 
confidence judgments have been regarded as a method of obtaining information about subjects’ 
response criterion placement across one or more memory strength dimensions (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005).  Although these theories differ in many respects (e.g., whether memory 
strength reflects the contribution of one or two memory processes, or a pure or aggregated 
signal), they rely on the common assumption that confidence is a proxy of strength.  For example, 
recognition of an item with a high degree of certainty is assumed to reflect a strong memory for 
the item, whereas recognition of an item with a low degree of certainty is assumed to reflect a 
weak memory for the item.  This assumption, however, seems disconnected from experiments 
showing that retrospective confidence judgments are not sampled directly from memory strength 
(Chandler, 1994; Nelson et al., 1990; Van Zandt, 2000; Wells et al., 1979, 1993), the evidence of 
violations of such assumption being particularly compelling when it comes to confidence in 
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recall (Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Koriat et al., 1980; Koriat & Ackerman, 2011; Robinson & 
Johnson, 1996). 
In a standard free recall experiment, subjects are presented with a set of stimuli and are 
asked to recall the studied items in any order.  Although simple, such paradigm offers ground for 
testing a counterintuitive prediction about the relation between memory strength and 
retrospective confidence in recall that has not been previously investigated, namely the idea that 
subjects can assign higher confidence judgments to weak relative to strong episodic memories.  
This idea is predicted by fuzzy-trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990) based on cognitive triage 
effects (Brainerd, Reyna, Howe, & Kevershan, 1991) and findings about the relation among 
confidence, retrieval latency, and output position in free recall (Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Jou, 
2008; Rohrer & Wixted, 1994).   
The cognitive triage effect is a recall output pattern in which the output position of 
recalled targets is organized in a weak → strong → weak item strength fashion, forming an 
inverted-U relation between output position and memory strength, as illustrated in Figure 2.  This 
effect is usually investigated by plotting a behavioral index of memory strength, namely the 
mean total number of errors on previous tests (MTE), as a function of output position (e.g., 
Marche, Howe, Lance, Owre, & Briere, 2009).  The triage process maximizes recall, which is the 
goal of free recall tasks, by minimizing output interference and maximizing episodic activation 
(for a review, see Brainerd et al., 1991).  Similar to MTE, confidence is often regarded as a 
proxy for memory strength (Mickes et al., 2011; Yonelinas, 1994; Wixted, 2007), but in contrast 
to MTE, it is a metacognitive marker of memory strength that has been shown to be highly 
influenced by retrieval latency (items that can be quickly retrieved are judged to be highly 
accurate; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993), which increases as a function of output position in free recall 
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tests (fast → slow latencies) (Rohrer & Wixted, 1994).  In connection with that, Jou (2008) 
found that confidence in recall is a monotonic decreasing function of output position.  Of course, 
such data do not elucidate whether confidence judgments are assigned based on retrieval latency 
or output position, or both, as the latter two variables are also correlated with each other.  
Nevertheless, the implication of such a finding is that subjects will make high confidence 
judgments to weak memories relative to strong memories during the beginning and middle of the 
free recall protocol whenever cognitive triage effects are observed, as indicated by the MTE 
statistic.  This prediction, which is illustrated in Panel A of Figure 3, follows from the notion that 
subjects do not have access to the strength of memory traces (Schwartz et al., 1997) and, 
therefore, are not aware of the effects of cognitive triage on output position.  An alternative 
hypothesis, illustrated in Panel B of Figure 3, is that subjects have access to the strength of 
memory traces and, therefore, can monitor cognitive triage.  As a result of the second prediction, 
retrospective confidence judgments will also show a triage pattern when cognitive triage effects 
are observed in free recall.  
Confidence as a method of measuring dual processes.  As in memory research using 
the remember/know procedure, confidence ratings have also been used to estimate dual 
processes in recognition, such as recollection and familiarity (Yonelinas, 1994; Yonelinas, 
Dobbins, Szymanski, Dhaliwal, & King, 1996).  One frequently used procedure consists of 
constructing receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves in order to estimate the intercept 
(recollection) and deflection of the curve (familiarity, d') that best fits the observed values of the 
hit rate (acceptance of targets), P(H), and the false alarm rate (acceptance of new items), P(FA), 
across confidence ratings.  Figure 4, for example, shows a hypothetical ROC curve in which + 
signs indicate levels of confidence that an item was studied (old) and – signs indicate levels of 
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confidence that an item was not studied (new).  Notice that when the false alarm rate = 0, the hit 
rate = .27, which is the estimate of recollection according to Yonelinas’ (1994) signal detection 
dual-process model.  Indeed, estimates of recollective retrieval in this model are highly 
influenced by extreme confidence ratings that an item was presented.  In particular, notice that 
recollection = P(H ˄ +++) as P(FA ˄ +++) → 0, and as long as the ability to discriminate old 
from new items is not below chance (d′ ≥ 0), recollection < P(H ˄ +++) as P(FA ˄ +++) → P(H 
˄ +++) but recollection > P(H ˄ +++) can never occur according to the model.  This indicates 
that correct recognition with extreme high confidence is a good proxy of recollection when the 
false alarm rate with extreme high confidence is low, but it tends to over-estimate it as the same 
false alarm rate increases and it can never underestimate recollection.  Familiarity, on the other 
hand, reflects subjects’ ability to discriminate old from new items, as measured in d' (SD units) 
(Macmillan & Creelman, 2005).  If subjects cannot discriminate old from new items, then 
familiarity (d') = 0 and the ROC curve would be a straight line intercepting the hit-axis at the 
level of recollection.  As subjects begin to better discriminate old from new items, the ROC 
curve starts bending towards the (hits, false alarms) = (1, 0) coordinate and, therefore, familiarity 
> 0.  In Figure 4, for example, familiarity = 2. 
Prior studies have shown that markers of recollective retrieval, such as remember 
judgments and correct source identification, are much higher when subjects are extremely 
confident that a test probe is a target than when subjects are not as confident.  Yonelinas (2001), 
for example, showed that 94% of the remembered items in a standard single-trial recognition 
experiment were recognized with the highest level of confidence (“sure [the test probe] was old”).  
In the same vein, subjects in Yonelinas’ (1999) study were presented with two lists and then 
asked to make confidence judgments about test probes (1 = “sure it was new”, ..., 6 = “sure it 
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was old”) that were either targets from either list or new items.  In addition, for items recognized 
as old, subjects were asked to make source judgments regarding whether the items were 
presented in list 1 or list 2.  Source accuracy was only reliably higher than chance when subjects 
were very confident that the test probe was a target—that is, when they gave a 6 confidence 
rating.   
Source judgments 
In everyday life, information that we are asked to recall or recognize (e.g., “Did you 
watch the Oscars on Sunday?”) might sometimes have occurred in different contexts (“Yes, I 
was at my home” or “Yes, I was at my girlfriend’s home”).  Similarly, memory researchers often 
present a focal list of items with different sources, such as color (e.g., presented in red or blue), 
gender (said by a male or a female), and font (presented in Arial or Times New Roman), and 
later ask subjects to make retrospective judgments about the source of recalled or recognized 
items (“Was it presented in red or blue?”).  After test, subjects’ responses are compared to the 
studied items’ actual source, in which subjects’ ability to discriminate between correct and 
incorrect sources is referred to as source accuracy.   
Over the last two decades, psychological research on the relationship between item and 
source memory, constructs in which the latter is usually regarded as dependent on the former, 
has proceeded in two ways.  In one, theories and measurement models have been developed to 
explain, and more rarely to predict, the relationship between item and source memory (Brainerd, 
Reyna, Holliday, & Nakamura, 2012; DeCarlo, 2003; Klauer & Kellen, 2010; Starns, Hicks, 
Brown, & Martin, 2008).  Batchelder and Riefer’s (1990) source memory model is a prominent 
example of this approach.  Let source j ∈ Θ, in which Θ is the set of all sources in the 
experiment, then in a standard old/new recognition experiment in which subjects’ item responses 
  
12 
are supplemented by judgments about its source, the model posits that correct item and source j 
recognition based on memories of them occurs with probability Djdj.  However, the model 
assumes that source j recognition from memory (dj) cannot occur without item memory (Dj), 
although it can be guessed in two ways, namely when source rather than item memory fails with 
probability Dj(1 - dj)a and when item memory fails with probability (1 - Dj)bg.  Item memory is 
then a pre-requisite to source memory in this model.  However, recent evidence suggests that, 
although very intuitive, this assumption does not always hold.  For example, Starns et al. (2008) 
have shown that subjects can recognize sources above chance performance even when they are 
unable to correctly recognize targets.  In addition, Brainerd et al. (2012) demonstrated that 
Batchelder and Riefer’s source memory model can neither fit over-distribution data in source 
memory experiments—non-zero probabilities of an item occupying mutually exclusive states, 
such as presented in List 1 and 2 when items are never presented in both lists—nor provide a 
theoretical account as to why manipulations that are known to affect memory, such as 
concreteness, list order, and word frequency, also affect over-distribution. 
In another vein of research, source judgments are assumed to rely on recollective retrieval 
(Yonelinas, 1999) or used as direct measures of it (Wais, Mickes, & Wixted, 2008; Wais, Squire, 
& Wixted, 2010; Wilding & Rugg, 1996).  In the latter case, source accuracy becomes an 
alternative to metacognitive judgments (e.g., judgments of remembering and very high 
confidence).  However, contrary to remember/know and confidence judgments, source accuracy 
is an objective measure of retrieval of contextual information, because subjects’ responses can be 
compared to items’ actual source—whether a studied item is presented in red or blue, for 
example, is known and manipulated by the experimenter.  The items’ actual state of 
remember/know and confidence, on the other hand, cannot be objectively assessed with 
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retrospective metacognitive judgments because of the intrinsic subjective nature of them.  To the 
best of my knowledge, however, there is not a single recall study that compared estimates of 
recollective retrieval using source judgments against estimates obtained with metacognitive 
judgments.  Therefore, whether the two produce similar estimates in recall is an empirical 
question.  
Summary 
Remember/know, confidence, and source judgments have been widely used as methods 
of measuring latent memory variables.  Remember judgments are used as direct proxies of 
recollective retrieval.  Confidence ratings are assumed to have a direct mapping with memory 
strength and used to construct ROC curves, in which the intercept of the latter is often thought to 
be a measure of recollective retrieval.  Correct source judgments are regarded as objective 
measures of recollective retrieval because, contrary to remember/know and confidence 
judgments, subjects’ source responses can be compared with the targets’ actual source 
(contextual information).  Despite differences in definition, in the type of instructions provided 
to subjects, and in the method of collecting each type of retrospective judgment, the reviewed 
judgments about memory are frequently used interchangeably in dual-process research 
predicated on the assumption that they tap similar concepts.  This is surprising because the 
evidence supporting this assumption is at best scarce, is restricted to recognition memory 
experiments, and has not been consistent across studies (Martin et al., 2011; Yonelinas, 2001; 
Yonelinas et al., 1996).  In the case of remember/know judgments, which is by far the most 
widely used method of measuring dual processes, Migo, Mayes, and Montaldi (2012) have 
argued that correct source and remember judgments should not be used interchangeably because 
remember judgments are often supported by noncriterial recollection (e.g., emotions and 
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impressions) that do not support correct source judgments.  In addition, Naveh-Benjamin and 
Kilb (2012) have indicated that the very use of remember/know judgments can interfere with the 
memory task and produce changes in subjects’ performance.   
The Present Study 
There is compelling evidence that retrospective metacognitive judgments can be affected 
by factors other than memory itself.  This poses obvious challenges to measurement models that 
make strong assumptions about the mapping between metacognitive judgments and memory 
(Tulving, 1985; Wixted, 2007; Yonelinas, 1999; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995) and it leaves a 
theoretical gap in our understanding about the relationship between memory and metamemory, 
and how to measure memory processes as well.  In the present study, I investigated this 
relationship by implementing a free recall paradigm that allowed the quantification of memory 
processes and strength in two independent ways, namely from retrospective judgments, such as 
remember/know, confidence, and source judgments, and from subjects’ history of recall across 
multiple trials.  The latter method requires further explanation, which is described next.   
Subjects receive a minimum of three study-test cycles on a focal list.  By the end of all 
cycles, a target’s history of recall across tests can be used as an objective measure of its memory 
strength, by assuming that the number of correct recalls in a target’s history of recall is a 
monotonically increasing function of its strength (or monotonically decreasing function in terms 
of errors).  For example, a target recalled on all tests is assumed to have a stronger memory trace 
than a target recalled only once.  In addition, targets generate sequences of correct and incorrect 
recall patterns across tests, which can be analyzed with a dual-recall Markov chain that separates 
and quantifies the retrieval processes that control recall (Brainerd, Aydin, & Reyna, 2012; 
Brainerd & Reyna, 2010; Gomes, Brainerd, & Stein, in press). 
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Dual-recall: Theory and model 
The notion that retrieval is supported by two fundamentally distinct types of processes is 
not by any means new (Strong, 1913) and has been target of much investigation and theoretical 
developments over the last three decades (Brainerd & Reyna, 2010; Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 1980; 
Yonelinas, 2002).  In the fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995), this notion takes the form 
of a distinction between two types of mental representations, namely verbatim and gist.  
Verbatim traces are realistic and detailed representations of an item, such as its surface features 
(e.g., color, font, and position), whose retrieval produces recollective phenomenology—vivid 
mental reinstatement of an item’s prior occurrence, as if flashing in the mind’s eyes.  Gist traces, 
on the other hand, are impressionistic and fuzzy representations of an item, such as the bottom-
line meaning of it (e.g., apple is an edible fruit), and thus reflect individuals’ understanding of 
the target event rather than the actual event.   
The dual-recall theory.  In the dual-recall model, dual-process distinctions are 
implemented in the form of a two-stage Markov model (Brainerd, Reyna, & Howe, 2009; Gomes, 
Brainerd, Nakamura, & Reyna, 2013), which posits that, over trials, studied items (targets) 
transition through performance states whose entries are controlled by either a recollective 
process, direct access of targets’ verbatim traces, or a nonrecollective one, reconstruction of 
targets from gist traces.  More specifically, individual items are assumed to transition through 
three discrete performance states, called states U, P, and L.  State U is a transient unlearned state, 
in which a target can be recalled with probability 0.  State P is a transient partially learned state, 
in which a target can be recalled with probability equal to some value 0 < p < 1.  State L is an 
absorbing learned state, in which a target can be recalled with probability 1.  Before the first trial, 
targets are assumed to begin in state U, as nothing has been learned about them and, therefore, 
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subjects cannot yet recall any target.  After the first trial, however, subjects learn something 
about the focal list, and then targets can transition from state U to either states P or L.  After 
subsequent trials, targets can also transition from state P to L, but once a target enters state L, it 
cannot leave this state as long as the study-test trials continue—hence, state L is an absorbing 
state. 
Retrieval of a target in state L is controlled by direct access.  This recall operation 
retrieves a target’s verbatim trace without comparing or searching through the traces of other 
items and, consequently, it is the faster type of retrieval operation.  In addition, direct access to 
verbatim traces supports errorless recall because it allows subjects to simply read targets out of 
consciousness as their surface forms are mentally restored.  Nonetheless, verbatim traces are 
more susceptible to sources of interference than are gist traces.  In a free recall test, for instance, 
output interference makes direct access more likely to operate during the initial part of the free 
recall test than later on, thus constraining subjects’ capacity to rely exclusively on direct access 
to recall list items (Barnhardt, Choi, Gerkens, & Smith, 2006; Brainerd & Reyna, 1993).  As 
subjects undergo additional trials, however, verbatim traces should become progressively less 
susceptible to interference, until extremes in which an entire list can be read out of 
consciousness—notice that, in the dual-recall model, this property is preserved by the absorbing 
feature of the recollective state L. 
Retrieval of a target in state P is controlled by reconstruction plus a slave operation, 
familiarity judgment.  Reconstruction controls entry into state P and is responsible for 
regenerating targets from partially identifying information.  The target apple, for instance, might 
be reconstructed from a gist representation of fruit, its bottom-line meaning.  Gist traces, 
however, provide a basis for reconstructing candidate items rather than identifying specific ones 
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(e.g., fruit generates candidates such as orange, apple, banana, and lemon) and, therefore, it is 
necessary a slave operation that performs familiarity checks on reconstructed items.  Similar to 
signal detection theory (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005), the model posits that subjects have an 
internal response criterion that is used to evaluate whether a reconstructed item should be output 
or withheld.  Therefore, the nonrecollective form of recall (reconstruction + familiarity judgment) 
is an error-prone operation because it will at times generate and authorize output of new items.  
Nonetheless, because it relies on episodic traces that are less susceptible to interference than 
verbatim traces, reconstruction avoids the interference obstacle faced by direct access.  
Consequently, the two forms of recall, recollective and nonrecollective, complement each 
other—whereas the limitations of direct access (susceptibility to interference) are repaired by 
reconstruction (interference resistant), the limitations of reconstruction (error-prone recall) are 
repaired by direct access (errorless recall)—and thus maximize correct recall.   
The measurement model.  The model posits that the probability of recalling a target is a 
function of both recollective and nonrecollective recall parameters, namely direct access (D), 
reconstruction (R), and familiarity judgment (J).  After an opportunity to study a focal list, and 
immediately prior to recall, the model posits that a target will be recalled if it occupies either the 
recollective state L, with probability D, or the nonrecollective state PC, with probability (1 – 
D)RJ.  Conversely, a target will not be recall if it occupies either state PE, with probability (1 – 
D)R(1 – J), or the state U, with probability (1 – D)(1 – R).  States U, PE, PC, and L are then 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive, as they describe all possible episodic states of a target 
immediately prior to recall.   
After a single study-test cycle, however, there will be only one empirical degree of freedom 
to estimate three free parameters, which makes the model’s parameters unidentifiable in single-
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trial designs.  One solution to this problem that has been advocated in prior studies (Brainerd et 
al., 2009, 2010) consists of defining the model over multiple- rather than single-trial designs.  In 
any recall paradigm (e.g., free or associative) in which subjects receive multiple study-test trials, 
as in this study, correct recall of a target on each test either occurs (1) or not (0).  After k 
successive trials, targets generate a frequency distribution over 2k possible error-success patterns 
across trials.  For k = 3, for instance, a target will generate one out of the 8 error-success patterns, 
namely 111 (recalled on all tests), 110 (recalled on al but the last test), …, 000 (never recalled).  
Such changes in recall over trials can be conceptualized as transitions through a discrete and 
finite state space, in which finite Markov chains (Kemeny & Snell, 1960) provide a natural 
formalism by assuming the following three properties.  First, changes in recall over trials consists 
of making transitions through a finite set of discrete episodic states ψ1, ..., ψs ∈ Ψ.  Second, the 
state a target occupies on trial n (for n = 1, ..., k) depends only on the state it occupied 
immediately prior to the current state, n – 1.  And third, at the level of individual targets, 
transitions through states between consecutive trials occur in an all-or-none fashion.  A plethora 
of evidence that has accumulated since the 1960’s has shown that all three assumptions hold in 
multi-trial recall designs, namely inter-trial transitions are all-or-none and Markovian at the item 
level and can be explained by models that have a small (more than two and less than five) set of 
exhaustive states (Bower & Theios, 1963; Estes & DaPolito, 1967; Greeno, 1968; Halff, 1977; 
Kintsch, 1963; Kintsch & Morris, 1965; Pagel, 1973) (for a review, see Brainerd, Howe, & 
Desrochers, 1982).  
Markov chains can be represented in terms of a unit starting vector, whose entries give the 
starting unconditional probabilities of each state, and one or more transition matrices, whose 
entries give the conditional probability of transitioning from state i on trial n - 1 to state j on trial 
  
19 
n.  In the dual-recall model, there are four mutually exclusive episodic states, namely U, PE, PC, 
L∈ Ψ.  Let 41
11
xjw ][ )()( =w  be a starting row vector and 44xijm ][=M  a transition matrix, then 
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Remember that the model assumes that state L is an absorbing state as long as study-test 
trials continue.  This assumption can then be formalized by changing the model’s transition 
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in which T  is a 3 x 3 sub-matrix of M  whose entries give the probabilities of making transitions 
through transient states (U, PE, and PC) when a transition to the recollective and absorbing state L 
does not occur, and a  is the 3 x 1 column sub-vector of M  whose entries give the probability of 
transitioning from transient states on trial n - 1 to the state L on trial n.  Although it is beyond the 
scope of this study to describe how all known properties of absorbing chains apply to the Markov 
chain of the dual-recall model, the canonical form of the transition matrix presented in Equation 
3 is useful in deriving several statistics that are characteristic of absorbing chains via 
computation of the model’s fundamental matrix ( ) 1−−= TIF , in which I is a 3 x 3 identity 
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matrix.  For example, the fundamental matrix of the dual-recall model can be used to compute 
statistics such as the probabilities of being absorbed by the recollective state L from each 
transient state, aF × , the probabilities of making a transition from each transient state to another 
transient state, ( ) 1−×− diagFIF , and the expected number of trials before a target is absorbed by the 
recollective state L, [ ]T111 ,,×F .  More importantly, however, when Equations 1 and 3 are 
multiplied together, the entries of the resulting unit row vector 41xnjn w ][ )()( =w  give the 
probability of a target occupying state j on trial n, as follows  
     
11 −×= nn Mww )()( ,     (4) 





























  .    (5) 
Because recall of a target occurs when it occupies either states L (recollective recall) or PC 
(nonrecollective recall), Equations 4 and 5 provide a straightforward method for computing the 
probability of correct recall of a target on trial n, Pn(Rc), namely as the inner product between 






































.   (6) 
Even though many parameterizations of the entries of the transition matrix M are possible 
(e.g., Brainerd et al., 2009, 2010, 2012), Equation 3 shows that direct access ought to be entries 
of the a  sub-vector, while reconstruction and familiarity judgment are the entries of the T  sub-
matrix.  In this study, I used a model version with two direct access parameters (D1, D2), one 
reconstruction parameter (R), and three familiarity judgment parameters (J1, J2, J3), defined over 
  
21 
a canonical study-test design of form S1T1 S2T2 S3T3, in which S is an opportunity to study a 
focal list and T to recall.  The definition of each parameter is shown in Table 1.  In this version 
of the dual-recall model, Equations 1 and 3 are re-written as  
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which produce the probabilities of each error-success pattern shown in Appendix 1. 
Experiment 
Two variables that have been shown to affect retrieval processes in recognition, namely 
list length (Brainerd, Wright, Reyna, & Payne, 2002; Cary & Reder, 2003; Yonelinas, 1994) and 
word frequency (Gardiner & Java, 1990; Guttentag & Carroll, 1997), were factorially 
manipulated in a multi-trial free recall design, the aim being to investigate how such variables 
affected recollective and nonrecollective retrieval as measured by subjective methods 
(remember/know and confidence judgments) and objective ones (source judgments and the dual-
recall model) in free recall.  From previous investigations, I expected that recall accuracy would 
decrease as both list length increased and word frequency decreased.   
At the process-level, one hypothesis is that subjective measures of dual processes tend to 
over-estimate recollective recall relative to objective ones, because subjective measures of 
recollection are boosted by factors that do not necessarily affect objective measures of it, namely 
noncriterial recollection.  Nonetheless, one might expect that the parameters of the dual-recall 
model would be correlated with retrospective judgments about memory because, theoretically, 
their definition overlaps to some degree.  More specifically, recollective recall, as measured by 
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retrospective judgments about memory, should correlate with direct access and the proportion of 
items in the recollective state L.  Indeed, recall of targets whose source can be correctly 
identified or are judged remembered should be particularly related to direct access, as the very 
definition of direct access (retrieval of a target’s verbatim trace) holds that subjects should be 
able to retrieve surface features of targets (e.g., color) in the recollective recall state L, which is 
critical to make accurate source judgments and to support remember judgments.  Conversely, 
nonorecollective recall, as measured by retrospective judgments about memory, should then 
correlate with reconstruction, familiarity judgment, and the proportion of items in the 
nonrecollective state PC.  In both cases, however, correlations should be moderated by subjects’ 
capacity to monitor the episodic states of recalled items. 
For each list, subjects received three study-test cycles and performed retrospective 
judgments about the items recalled on the last test.  The dual-recall model was fit to the data 
generated across test trials in order to estimate recollective and nonrecollective parameters.  
Model parameters were then used to provide process-level explanations of the effects of list 
length and word frequency on free recall and to separate recollective from nonrecollective 
retrieval of the same items that subjects made retrospective judgments about, thus allowing 
comparison of subjective and objective measures of dual processes.  Correlational analyses 
between retrospective judgments and individualized model parameter estimates were also 






Ninety-five undergraduates (64 female), aged 20 years on average (SD = 2 years), 
participated in this experiment for extra credit.  Written informed consent was obtained from all 
subjects prior to the beginning of the experiment.  
Experimental design 
A 3 (list length: short, medium, long) × 2 (word frequency: low, high) × 3 (type of 
retrospective judgment: remember/know/guess, confidence, source) full factorial mixed-design 
was used, in which list length and word frequency were manipulated within-subjects, and type of 
retrospective judgment was manipulated between-subjects.  
Materials 
Each subject studied three unrelated word lists across the experiment, a short list 
composed of 16 words (8 low and 8 high frequency), a medium list composed of 30 words (15 
low and 15 high frequency), and a long list composed of 60 words (30 low and 30 high 
frequency).  Low frequency (M = 2) and high frequency words (M = 197) (Kucera & Francis, 
1967; Thorndike & Lorge, 1944) were randomly selected from Toglia and Battig’s (1978) word 
norms.  None of the conditions differed with respect to mean number of letters (M = 5.7), 
concreteness (M = 5.5), and imagery (M = 5.5) at the .05 significance level.  Half of the words 
were presented in blue, while the other half in red.  Each word list is presented in Appendix 2. 
Procedure 
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to one of three 
groups that either made remember/know/guess, confidence, or source judgments, and the order 
that the short, medium, and long lists were learned was also randomly assigned to each subject.  
For each focal list, subjects received a standard multiple-trial noncanonical study-test procedure 
that has been used in recent experiments to measure recollective and nonrecollective retrieval in 
  
24 
recall (Brainerd et al., 2012; Brainerd & Reyna, 2010; Gomes et al., in press).  The overall 
procedure was S1B1aT1a B1bT1b  S2B2T2  S3B3T3  R, in which S denotes a study phase, B a buffer 
activity, T a free recall test, and R a retrospective judgment phase.  During the study phases, the 
words were presented individually at a 2 sec rate on a computer screen, with 1 sec of inter-word 
interval, and subjects were told to pay close attention because their memory for the words would 
be tested later.  The presentation order of all words was randomized for each subject and study 
phase.  During the test phases, subjects performed a free recall test in which they were told to 
type as many studied words as possible and not to worry about spelling.  Free recall was self-
paced and terminated upon an input from the subject (the word “finish”).  During the 
retrospective judgment phase, subjects were exposed to the words they recalled on the last test, 
in the same order they recalled them, and were instructed to make retrospective judgments about 
the recalled words according to the group to which they were assigned in the beginning of the 
experiment.   
The instructions to make the three types of retrospective judgments were modeled on 
ones used in previous studies (e.g., Gardiner, 1988; Mickes et al., 2011; Rajaram, 1993; Wais et 
al., 2008).  Subjects in the remember/know/guess group were instructed to make the following 
judgments regarding the words recalled on the last test: a “remember” judgment if they were able 
to bring back to mind a particular association, image, or something more personal from the time 
of study, or what the word looked like, such as its color, or sounded like when they read it to 
themselves during study; a “know” judgment if they had a feeling that they saw the word during 
study, but were unable to bring back to mind any qualitative information about it; and a “guess” 
judgment if they simply guessed the word during recall.  Subjects in the confidence group were 
instructed to make the following judgments regarding the words recalled on the last test: (- - -) 1 
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= Very confident that the recalled word was not studied, ..., (+ + +) 6 = Very confident that the 
recalled word was studied.  In addition, subjects were told to be cautious about using the end 
points of the scale, and to use them only if they could not be mistaken about their answer: “Use 1 
or 6 only if you are so confident in your answer that you would be willing to testify in a court of 
law, even in a life-or-death situation.”  And finally, subjects in the source group were instructed 
to make judgments regarding the color (red or blue) of the words they recalled on the last test.  
The instructions are shown in Appendix 3. 
Results 
The results are reported in five sections.  In the first section, I report analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) that evaluated whether there were reliable differences in recall accuracy among 
experimental conditions.  In the second section, I present model-based analyses.  Specifically, 
the dual-recall model was fit to the data in order to separate recollective from nonrecollective 
retrieval and to provide process explanations for differences in recall accuracy.  In the third 
section, I present the results from analyses of the retrospective judgments (remember/know/guess, 
confidence, and source judgments) for items recalled on the last test.  Because both the dual-
recall model and the three retrospective judgments can be used as methods of separating memory 
processes in recall, in the fourth section I report comparisons among the various methods of 
decomposing recall performance into its recollective and nonrecollective components as well as 
correlational analyses between the dual-recall model and retrospective judgments.  It will be seen 
that retrospective judgments tend to over-estimate recollective retrieval in free recall relative to 
the dual-recall model.  Finally, in the fifth section, I report differences in performance measures 
and retrospective judgments as a function of the output position of items recalled on the last test.  
For all statistical tests, I adopted a .05 significance criterion.  Because Type I error increases as a 
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function of the number of tests, multiple comparisons were only conducted when there was 
global statistical evidence of treatment effects, as indicated by omnibus tests, and multiple t-tests 
were adjusted using the Bonferroni correction. 
Recall accuracy 
Recall accuracy was evaluated with two statistics, the proportion of words correctly 
recalled on each trial and the mean total correct recalls per item across trials (MTR).  In both 
cases, I computed the statistics for the T1aT2T3 and T1bT2T3 sequences and then averaged (T1T2T3) 
because the results were identical.  Summary statistics for each measure are presented in Table 2 
as a function of word frequency and list length.  The proportion of words correctly recalled was 
submitted to a 3 (test trial: T1, T2, T3) x 3 (list length: short, medium, long) x 2 (word frequency: 
low, high) repeated measures ANOVA.  There were main effects of test trial, F(2,188) = 936.5, 
MSE = .02, η²p = .91, and list length, F(2,188) = 225.6, MSE = .05, η²p = .71, and interactions 
between test trial and list length, F(4,376) = 20.9, MSE = .01, η²p = .18, between test trial and 
word frequency, F(2,188) = 7.82, MSE = .01, η²p = .08, and between word frequency and list 
length, F(2,188) = 13.7, MSE = .03, η²p = .13.  Regardless of experimental condition, the mean 
proportion of words correctly recalled increased from trial 1 (.28) to trial 2 (.51) to trial 3 (.62).  
Regarding list length, the mean proportion of recalled words increased from the long list 
condition (.34) to the medium list (.46) to the short list (.61), and the interaction with test trial 
indicates that such difference was larger on later trials (trials 2 and 3) relative to the first trial.  
The effects of word frequency on recall, however, depended on both list length and test trial.  
More specifically, subjects recalled more high than low frequency words only in the long list 
condition, and the recall advantage of high frequency words over low frequency was only 
reliable on trial 3. 
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The results with the MTR were consistent with the analysis of the proportion of words 
correctly recalled.  Because the MTR is a measure of overall performance, however, it cannot 
address trial-by-trial variability in recall.  Nonetheless, in addition to list length and word 
frequency, it was used to investigate whether there were differences in performance among the 
groups of subjects assigned to each type of retrospective judgment1—there were not.  The MTR 
was submitted to a 3 (list length: short, medium, long) x 2 (word frequency: low, high) x 3 (type 
of retrospective judgment: remember/know/guess, confidence, source) repeated measures 
ANOVA, which produced a main effect of list length, F(2,184) = 217.4, MSE = .14, η²p = .70, 
and an interaction between list length and word frequency, F(2,184) = 13.1, MSE = .08, η²p = .13.  
Inspection of Table 2 shows that, on average, the MTR increased from the long list condition 
(1.03) to medium list (1.39) to short list (1.84), regardless of word frequency.  As before, 
however, the effects of word frequency depended on list length, namely it was reliable only in 
the long list condition.  The difference in MTR for high and low frequency words was .22, which 
was more than half a SD unit (.58 SD units) and highly reliable. 
Dual-recall model analysis 
While the analysis of recall accuracy pinpointed treatment effects of list length and word 
frequency on recall, the purpose of this section is to pinpoint the process loci of such effects.  As 
in the previous analysis, the dual-recall model was first fit to the data from both T1aT2T3 and 
T1bT2T3 sequences.  Because the results of fit tests and the parameter estimates did not differ 
between the two, I report only the results with the pooled data (T1T2T3).  Equations A1-A8 were 
applied to the data of each experimental condition via an EM algorithm (Hu & Batchelder, 1994) 
that maximized Equation A12, which produced the maximum likelihood estimates of direct 
access, reconstruction, and familiarity judgment parameters shown in Table 3.  First, however, I 
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address the question of whether the dual-recall model provides a close description of the data, 
which was investigated with goodness of fit tests.  If the dual-recall model fails to fit the data by 
rejecting the null hypothesis of fit, then a more complex model is needed.  Each test produces a 
G² statistic that is asymptotically distributed as χ² (Riefer & Batchelder, 1988) with 1 degree of 
freedom.  Because there are 3 (list length) x 2 (word frequency) = 6 conditions in the experiment, 
the critical value to reject the null hypothesis of fit for the experiment as a whole is 12.53.  
However, the observed value for the experiment as a whole was below the critical value, G² = 
9.43, and thus the dual-recall model passed goodness of fit tests.  In addition, simpler (one-stage) 
models in which items transition either through states U and L or through states P and L, did not 
pass goodness of fit tests.  For the experiment as a whole, the one-stage model in which items 
transition through states U and L produces a G² statistic with 30 dfs (the critical value is 43.77), 
while the one-stage model in which items transition through states P and L produces a G² 
statistic with 12 dfs (the critical value is 21.03).  The null hypothesis of fit for each model was 
rejected, as the observed fit statistics were well above the respective critical values (for the U and 
L model, G² = 47909.22, and for the P and L model, G² = 1564.32). 
Turning to the parameter estimates shown in Table 3, we first conducted an 
experimentwise likelihood ratio test to address whether there were reliable process-level 
differences among all experimental conditions.  This test produces a G² statistic with 30 degrees 
of freedom and a critical value of 43.77 to reject the null hypothesis that there are no process-
level differences among experimental conditions.  The observed value for this test was roughly 
42 times higher than the critical value, G² = 1834.35, thus rejecting the null hypothesis.  Next, I 
conducted a series of condition-wise tests, which are the analogue of ANOVAs’ F-tests.  This 
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analysis revealed reliable process-level differences for both list length, G²(12) = 1652.17, and 
word frequency, G²(6) = 75.35.   
List length affected both recollective and nonrecollective processes.  Regarding 
recollective retrieval, inspection of Table 3 suggests that mean direct access decreased from the 
short list condition (.21) to the medium list (.16) to the long list (.12).  Likelihood ratio tests 
indicated that such decreases were reliable for D1, G²(2) = 27.77, but not for D2, G²(2) = .70, 
indicating that list length produces baseline differences in recollective retrieval rather than in the 
rate of transition to a recollective retrieval state after the first trial.  Regarding nonrecollective 
retrieval, mean reconstruction also decreased from the short list condition (.44) to the medium 
list (.27) to the long list (.18).  Such differences were supported by likelihood ratio tests, which 
revealed a reliable difference in R among list length levels, G²(2) = 92.99.  Similarly, mean 
familiarity judgment decreased from the short list condition (.64) to the medium list (.58) to the 
long list (.52).  However, close inspection of Table 3 suggests that such difference was primarily 
due to trial-by-trial invariance in the J parameters in the long list condition, as opposed to the J 
increases across trials in both the medium and short list conditions.  Concerning between-
condition differences, there was a significant difference in J2 among list length levels, G²(2) = 
11.93, and in J3, G²(2) = 10.64, but not in J1, G²(2) = 1.49.  Concerning within-condition 
differences, J reliably increased across trials in both the short list, G²(2) = 51.41, and medium list 
conditions, G²(2) = 12.89, but not in the long list condition, G²(2) = 5.76.  Therefore, the effects 
of list length on learning (recall increases across trials) were due to nonrecollective retrieval. 
Process-level differences in word frequency were only reliable in the long list condition, 
and affected primarily recollective retrieval.  Visual inspection of Table 3 suggests that mean 
direct access decreased slightly from high to low frequency in the long list condition, and 
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likelihood ratio tests indicated that both differences in D1, G²(1) = 20.59, and in D2, G²(1) = 
16.61, between high and low frequency words were small but highly reliable.  This result 
indicates that word frequency not only affects baseline levels of recollective retrieval (more high 
than low frequency words being in that state), but it also affects the transition rate to the 
recollective state L across trials (more high than low frequency words transition to the 
recollective retrieval state L as subjects have additional opportunities to study and recall targets).  
Although reconstruction did not significantly differ between high and low frequency words, 
familiarity judgment did—specifically, J1 was reliably higher for high frequency words than low 
frequency, G²(1) = 8.34.  There were no other reliable process-level differences. 
Retrospective judgments about memory 
There were three types of retrospective judgments for items recalled on the last trial (trial 
3), namely remember/know/guess, confidence, and source judgments.  I report the results for 
each of them separately. 
Remember/know judgments.  On average, subjects assigned to the 
remember/know/guess group made more “remember” judgments (.71) than both “know” (.27) 
and “guess” judgments (.02).  Because “guess” judgments were not reliably different from 0, 
they were omitted from subsequent analyses.  Summary statistics for the proportion of items 
recalled on the last test that received either a “remember” judgment or a “know” judgment are 
shown in Table 4 as a function of experimental conditions.  The data in Table 4 were submitted 
to a 3 (list length: short, medium, long) x 2 (word frequency: low, high) x 2 (type of judgment: 
remember, know) repeated measures ANOVA, which revealed a main effect of type of judgment, 
F(1, 26) = 54.6, MSE = .15, η²p = .68, and list length, F(2, 52) = 43.4, MSE = .01, η²p = .63.  The 
mean proportion of words recalled on the last test was higher for those that received a 
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“remember” judgment than for those that received a “know” judgment, and furthermore, both 
measures decreased significantly from the short list to the medium list to the long list conditions.  
There were neither reliable effects of word frequency nor reliable interactions. 
Confidence judgments.  Changes in confidence across conditions were investigated with 
two measures, the mean confidence rating and the proportion recalled per confidence rating.  
Summary statistics for both measures are shown in Table 5.  Visual inspection of Table 5 
suggests that mean confidence ratings were invariant across experimental conditions, which was 
confirmed by a 3 (list length: short, medium, long) x 2 (word frequency: low, high) repeated 
measures ANOVA that did not produce any reliable effects, Fs ≤ 1.99.  However, the mean 
proportion of recalled words that received very high confidence ratings (+ + +, 6) seemed to 
decrease from the short list condition to the long.  To investigate whether such declines were 
reliable, the mean proportion of recalled words that either received a very high confidence rating 
or lower ratings was submitted to a 3 (list length: short, medium, long) x 2 (word frequency: low, 
high) x 2 (confidence level: + + +, lower) repeated measures ANOVA.  The analysis produced a 
main effect of confidence level, F(1, 27) = 11.3, MSE = .57, η²p = .30, list length, F(2, 54) = 62.5, 
MSE = .01, η²p = .70, and word frequency, F(1, 27) = 11.2, MSE = .01, η²p = .29.  The mean 
proportion of recalled words that received a very high confidence rating was reliably higher (.46) 
than those that received lower confidence ratings (.18).  In addition, regardless of confidence 
level, the mean proportion of recalled words decreased both as list length increased and as word 
frequency decreased.  There were no reliable interactions. 
Source judgments.  Source judgments (color) were used to compute two statistics, 
source accuracy and the proportion of words recalled whose source was either correctly 
identified or not.  The means and standard deviations of both types of measures are shown in 
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Table 6 as a function of experimental conditions.  Across all conditions, mean source accuracy 
(.63) was reliably higher than chance (.50), t(39) = 6.89.  Visual inspection of Table 6 suggests 
that mean source accuracy tends to decrease as list length increases.  However, when the mean 
source accuracy data were submitted to a 3 (list length: short, medium, long) x 2 (word 
frequency: low, high) repeated measures ANOVA, there were neither reliable effects nor 
interactions, Fs ≤ 2.04.  However, the proportions of recalled words as a function of source 
accuracy produced reliable effects.  The data were submitted to a 3 (list length: short, medium, 
long) x 2 (word frequency: low, high) x 2 (source accuracy: correct, incorrect) repeated measures 
ANOVA, which produced main effects of list length, F(2, 76) = 65.6, MSE = .01, η²p = .63, and 
source accuracy, F(1, 38) = 37.5, MSE = .08, η²p = .50, and an interaction between list length and 
source accuracy, F(2, 76) = 6.95, MSE = .31, η²p = .16.  Subjects recalled more words whose 
source was correctly identified (.38) than words whose source was not correctly identified (.22), 
and such difference increased as list length decreased.  Even though the proportion of recalled 
words decreased as list length increased, regardless of source accuracy, such decreases were 
larger for recalled words whose source was correctly identified than for words whose source was 
incorrectly identified.  There were no other reliable effects. 
Relationship between the dual-recall model and retrospective judgments 
In this section, I addressed questions regarding similarities and differences among the 
various methods of decomposing recall into its recollective and nonrecollective components, 
namely via the dual-recall model or the three retrospective judgments about memory 
(remember/know, confidence, and source judgments), and whether components of such 
separation methods correlate at the level of individuals. 
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Recall decomposition.  The proportion of words recalled on the last test (see Table 1) 
was decomposed into its recollective and nonrecollective components via four separation 
methods, namely the dual-recall model, source accuracy, remember/know judgments, and 
confidence ratings.  Because retrospective judgments were made only for items output on the last 
trial, for the dual-recall model, the parameter estimates in Table 3 were plugged into the model’s 
starting vector and transition matrices in order to estimate the proportion of recalled items in 
state L (recollective recall state) and state PC (nonrecollective recall state) on trial 3 via Equation 
5.  For source accuracy, the proportion of recalled words whose source was correctly identified 
was used as a measure of recollective retrieval, while nonrecollective retrieval was the 
proportion of recalled words whose source was incorrectly identified.2  For remember/know 
judgments, the proportion of recalled words that received a “remember” judgment was used as a 
measure of recollective retrieval, while nonrecollective retrieval was the proportion of recalled 
words that received either a “know” or “guess” judgment.  For confidence ratings, the proportion 
of recalled words that received the maximum confidence rating (+ + +, 6) was used as a measure 
of recollective retrieval, while nonrecollective retrieval was the proportion of recalled words that 
received confidence ratings lower than the maximum (5, 4, 3, 2, or 1).3  In all cases, the 
decomposition was performed on recall performance of the whole sample (see Table 1), rather 
than individual groups, and separated only by list length, as previous analyses have not shown 
reliable differences in recall accuracy among retrospective judgment groups and none of the 
retrospective judgments interacted with word frequency. 
Three main findings emerged when recall was decomposed into recollective and 
nonrecollective recall (see Figure 5), two concerning qualitative similarities among the 
separation methods and one concerning quantitative differences among them.  Regarding their 
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similarities, all four separation methods showed that recollective recall prevailed over 
nonrecollective recall on the last trial.  Across all conditions and separation methods, recall on 
the last test was roughly 2 times more likely to be supported by recollective retrieval than 
nonrecollective retrieval—it accounted for 2/3 of the recalled words.  In addition, regardless of 
the separation method, recollective recall decreased as list length increased.  However, close 
inspection of Figure 5 indicates that all three retrospective judgments, particularly 
remember/know and confidence judgments, tended to over-estimate recollective retrieval relative 
to the dual-recall model.4  Nonetheless, such a tendency depended on list length—specifically, 
overestimation was higher in the short list condition than in the long list condition.  Relative to 
the dual-recall model, recollective retrieval estimated from retrospective judgments was 1.28, 
1.23, and 1.00 times higher in the short, medium, and long list conditions, respectively.   
Correlational analysis.  Next, I investigated the individual-level relationship between 
parameters of the dual-recall model and the retrospective measures of dual processes.  This 
analysis consisted of, first, estimating parameters of the dual-recall model for each subject across 
all conditions (i.e., computing experimentwise parameter estimates to maximize parameter 
reliability) and, second, running correlations between parameters and experimentwise statistics 
of the retrospective measures of dual processes.  Regarding model fit, the critical value to reject 
the null hypothesis of fit of the dual-recall model is 3.84 for each subject.  The observed G²(1) 
value for one subject was roughly 6 times higher than the critical value and, therefore, the subject 
was removed from subsequent analyses.  For the remaining subjects, the mean G²(1) value was 
2.12 and the null hypothesis of fit could not be rejected for 82% of the subjects.   
The correlations between parameters of the dual-recall model and retrospective measures 
of dual processes are shown in Table 7.  The definition of recollective and nonrecollective 
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retrieval for each separation method was the same as used in the recall decomposition analysis.  
Inspection of Table 7 indicates that, overall, recall followed by either correct source 
identification or remember judgment correlate with direct access of targets’ verbatim traces in 
free recall.  Recall followed by correct source identification showed reliable positive correlations 
with the dual-recall model’s recollective retrieval statistics, namely D1, D2, mean D, and the 
proportion of items in the recollective state L on the last trial.  Similarly, recall followed by 
remember judgment also showed reliable correlations with the dual-recall model’s recollective 
retrieval statistics.  Unlike correct source identification, however, recall followed by remember 
judgment correlated positively with reconstruction and negatively with familiarity judgment, 
indicating that remember judgments are influenced by recollective retrieval processes and, to a 
lesser degree, by nonrecollective retrieval processes.  In contrast, recall followed by a maximum 
confidence rating did not show reliable correlations with any statistic from the dual-recall model, 
and thus confidence was completely independent of recall accuracy.   
Whereas recall followed by correct source identification or remember judgment predicted 
all recollective retrieval statistics of the dual-recall model, recall followed by maximum 
confidence did not.  This result is illustrated in Figure 6, in which the proportion of items 
recalled in the recollective state L on trial 3, measured by the dual-recall model, is plotted against 
the three retrospective measures of recollective retrieval, namely recall followed by remember 
judgment (Figure 6A), or followed by correct source identification (Figure 6B), or followed by 
maximum confidence (Figure 6C).  As in the recall decomposition analysis, Figure 6 shows that 
retrospective measures of dual processes, particularly remember/know and confidence judgments, 
tend to over-estimate recollective retrieval in free recall, as most observations fell under the 
identity line (perfect calibration) in panels A, B, and C.  For correct source judgments, the best 
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fitting linear function (solid line), y = .71x, F(1, 38) = 7.10, indicates that calibration is best 
closer to the origin rather than at higher values.  Similarly, for remember judgments, the best 
fitting linear function, y = .85x, F(1, 25) = 12.30, indicates that calibration is also best closer to 
the origin and it decreases thereafter, although such decreases are lower than for source 
judgments.  Regarding nonrecollective retrieval, none of the retrospective judgments showed 
reliable correlations with the dual-recall model’s nonrecollective retrieval statistics, suggesting 
that subjects were better able to monitor items occupying a recollective state on the last test than 
items occupying a nonrecollective state.   
Output position 
The analysis of output position focused on items recalled on the last trial, as retrospective 
judgments were only made to such items.  The results are presented in two parts.  In the first, the 
results of the analysis of output variability in four measures of items recalled on trial 3 are 
presented—specifically, the mean total number of errors per item (MTE), the mean confidence 
rating, the proportion of “remember” responses, and source accuracy.  In the second part, the 
results of the analysis of output dependencies for each of the four measures of items recalled on 
trial 3 are presented.  Because the latter analysis was not central to the present study, it was 
presented in Appendix 5.  For all such analyses, output position was first partitioned into 
vincentised quartiles (VO1, VO2, VO3, and VO4) (Levine & Burke, 1972).  For example, if a 
subject recalled 12 words on the last test, then the first 3 words in the subject’s free recall 
protocol are part of the 1st vincentised output position (VO1), the next 3 are part of the 2nd 
vincentised output position (VO2), and so on.  However, if a subject recalled 16 words on the 
last test, then the first 4 words in the subject’s free recall protocol are part of VO1, the next 4 are 
part of VO2, and so on.   
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Output variability.  The MTE, the mean confidence rating, the mean proportion of 
remember responses, and the mean source accuracy measures are shown in Figures 7, 8, 9, and 
10, respectively, as a function of both vincentised output position in the last trial and list length.  
Regarding MTE, visual inspection of Figure 7 suggests that cognitive triage (i.e., a U-shaped 
pattern in MTE as a function of output position) interacted with list length, namely it increased 
as list length decreased.  To investigate whether this interaction was reliable, we submitted the 
MTE to a 3 (list length: short, medium, long) x 4 (output position: VO1, VO2, VO3, VO4) x 3 
(retrospective judgment group: remember/know/guess, confidence, source) repeated measures 
ANOVA, which showed a small but reliable interaction between list length and output position, 
F(6, 552) = 2.02, MSE = .54, η²p = .02.  In the short list condition, MTE was reliably higher in 
VO2 (1.56) than in VO3 (1.20).  Notice, however, that this pattern was not observed with mean 
confidence ratings (Figure 8), which only decreased as a function of output position (according 
to the MTE analysis, it should increase) and it did not interact with list length.  As before, we 
submitted the mean confidence ratings to a 3 (list length: short, medium, long) x 4 (output 
position: VO1, VO2, VO3, VO4) repeated measures ANOVA, which only revealed a main effect 
of output position, F(3, 81) = 3.88, MSE = .15, η²p = .13.  Regardless of list length, mean 
confidence ratings reliably decreased from VO1 (5.68) to VO4 (5.49).  Although the mean 
proportion of remember responses (Figure 9) seemed to behave more like confidence ratings 
than MTE across output positions, and source accuracy (Figure 10) seemed to behave more like 
MTE than confidence ratings across output positions, neither source accuracy nor remember 




This study had three main objectives.  The first objective was to investigate the effects of 
list length and word frequency on both subjective and objective measures of recollective and 
nonrecollective processes in free recall.  The second objective was to investigate the relationship 
between the dual-recall model and retrospective judgments about memory that are used as tools 
for measuring dual processes in episodic memory tasks.  The third objective was to test the 
hypothesis that subjects can assign higher confidence to items associated with weaker memory 
traces relative to items associated with stronger memory traces.  Subjects received multiple 
study-test trials and then performed one out of three types of retrospective judgments about 
targets recalled on the last test, namely remember/know, confidence, and source judgments.  This 
procedure allowed me to compute subjective and objective measures of memory processes and 
strength. 
As expected from prior investigations (Brainerd et al., 2002; Cary & Reder, 2003; Deese, 
1960; Gregg, Montgomery, & Castaño, 1980; Tulving & Patkau, 1962; Yonelinas, 1994), the 
proportion of correctly recalled words decreased as list length increased, and high frequency 
words were better recalled than low frequency words in the long list condition.  The four 
methods of separating recollective from nonrecollective recall produced process explanations for 
the effects of list length and word frequency in recall.  In addition, the separation methods 
revealed qualitative similarities and quantitative differences among them.  I discuss such findings 
in the next sections. 
List length in free recall 
List length produces similar effects in recognition and recall (Brainerd et al., 2002; Cary 
& Reder, 2003; Ward, 2002)—specifically, recognition and recall accuracy increase as list length 
decreases.  Although dual-process research has indicated that list length affects recollective 
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retrieval and spares nonrecollective retrieval in recognition (Yonelinas, 1994; Yonelinas & 
Jacoby, 1994), whether the same explanation applies to free recall is unknown.  Indeed, the 
findings reported in this study suggest that current dual-process explanations of such effect tell 
an incomplete story in free recall.  As in recognition, list length affected recollective retrieval in 
free recall.  However, the current dual-process explanation is incomplete because list length 
affected a nonrecollective process in free recall that is not required in recognition, namely 
reconstruction.  On average, recollective recall decreased from .22 to .15 to .10 on the first trial 
in the short, medium, and long list conditions, respectively, and similarly, nonrecollective recall 
(reconstruction + familiarity judgment) decreased from .16 to .11 to .08 in the same conditions.  
On the first trial, decreases in nonrecollective retrieval across list lengths were due to 
reconstruction rather than familiarity judgment, suggesting that list length affects target 
reconstruction from partial information rather than subjects’ inclination to output reconstructed 
items.   
Because a multi- rather than a single-trial design was used in this study, it was also 
possible to address a question that has not figured in dual-process research before, namely are the 
process level effects of list length across trials the same as on the first trial?  The answer is no.  
As subjects received new opportunities to study and recall the focal lists, two patterns emerged.  
First, list length affected the rate of learning.  While the difference in recall between the short 
and long list conditions was .14 on the first trial, the same difference increased roughly twofold 
on the third trial, to .27.  Second, at the process level, list length affected the rate of learning via 
nonrecollective processes.  Targets’ transition rate from the no-recall states U and PE to the 
nonrecollective recall state PC (measured with parameters R, J2, and J3) increased as the list 
length decreased, but the transition rate from the same no-recall states to the recollective recall 
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state L (measured with parameter D2) did not change reliably across list lengths.  In particular, 
subjects inclination to output reconstructed targets increased from the first to the third trials in 
the short and medium list length conditions, but not in the long list length condition.  
Consequently, differences in nonrecollective recall between the short and long list length 
conditions increased from the first to the last trials.  On the first trial, nonrecollective recall 
decreased from .16 in short list condition to .08 in the long list condition, whereas on the last trial, 
nonrecollective recall decreased from .35 to .16 in the same conditions. 
After the last test trial, subjects were asked to make retrospective judgments about items 
recalled on the last test, which were then used to decompose recall in terms of its recollective and 
nonrecollective components (see Figure 5).  This analysis indicated that, regardless of 
measurement method, list length affected both recollective and nonrecollective retrieval in free 
recall.  In other words, the process-level effects of list length indicated via model-based analysis 
were also supported by retrospective judgments about memory.  Nonetheless, retrospective 
judgments about memory tended to over-estimate recollective recall relative to the dual-recall 
model in the short and medium list length conditions.   
In sum, list length affected free recall in two ways.  The first is an extension to free recall 
of the process explanation of the effects of list length on recognition.  Specifically, as list length 
decreases, recollective retrieval (direct access of targets’ verbatim traces) increases.  The second 
way that list length affects free recall is different from recognition, because it involves a 
nonrecollective process that is not necessary in recognition, namely targets’ reconstruction from 
partial information.  In addition, changes in nonrecollective processes across trials accounted for 
the effects of list length on the rate of learning.  More specifically, from the first to the last trials, 
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subjects became ever more prone to output reconstructed targets from shorter than from longer 
lists. 
Word frequency in free recall 
Contrary to list length, word frequency has opposite effects in recognition and recall 
(Gregg, 1976; Guttentag & Carroll, 1997; MacLeod & Kampe, 1996).  Recognition accuracy is 
higher for low rather than high frequency words, whereas recall accuracy is higher for high 
rather than low frequency words.  In typical old/new recognition experiments in which subjects 
study lists of low and high frequency words, word frequency produces a mirror effect (Glanzer & 
Adams, 1985).  Although subjects are slightly more prone to accept high frequency targets 
during test than low frequency targets (i.e., the hit rate is slightly higher for high frequency 
words relative to low frequency words), they are also much less prone to accept low frequency 
distractors than high frequency distractors (i.e., the false alarm rate is much lower for low 
frequency words relative to high frequency words), and thus, recognition accuracy is usually 
better for low rather than high frequency words.   
In a free recall experiment, on the other hand, the test is self-cued, which means that 
subjects need to retrieve targets by themselves rather than to compare test probes against stored 
information about studied items.  The present study used the latter type of test and revealed that 
high frequency words were better recalled than low frequency words in the long list length 
condition.  At the process-level, the recall advantage of high frequency words relative to low 
frequency ones was mainly recollective.  In the long list length condition, 12% of the high 
frequency targets were recalled recollectively, whereas 8% of the low frequency targets were 
recalled recollectively.  Such difference, although small, was highly reliable.  In addition, list 
length also affected familiarity judgment on the first trial, a component of nonrecollective recall.  
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However, because nonrecollective recall was particularly small in the long list condition during 
the first trial (.08), familiarity judgment accounted for a difference of roughly 1% in 
nonrecollective recall between high frequency words (.09) and low frequency words (.08), and 
thus it should be interpreted with caution. 
As in the case of list length, word frequency also affected the rate of learning, even 
though the interaction between word frequency and test trial was smaller (η²p = .08) than the 
interaction between list length and test trial (η²p = .18).  However, contrary to list length, process-
level analysis indicated that the effect of word frequency on learning was purely recollective.  
Specifically, D2 was reliably higher for high frequency words relative to low frequency words in 
the long list condition, while none of the nonrecollective parameters showed significant 
differences (see Table 3).  Despite that, none of the retrospective judgments about memory 
showed reliable effects of word frequency in free recall and, therefore, they do not provide a 
process explanation of differences in recall accuracy.  This could, of course, be due to 
differences in statistical power among measurement methods (model-based analyses used the 
data from the entire sample, whereas retrospective judgments used the data from sub-samples) 
and do not, by any means, indicate that retrospective judgments might provide a different 
explanation in comparison to the dual-recall model.  In fact, for recalled targets from the long list 
condition that either received remember judgments or whose source were correctly identified, the 
results go in the same direction as the findings from model-based analysis.  In the case of 
remember/know judgments (see Table 4), recall followed by remember judgments was 
numerically higher for high frequency words than low frequency words (the difference was .07), 
whereas the difference in recall followed by know judgments between high and low frequency 
words was numerically lower (the difference was .02).  Similarly, in the case of source 
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judgments (see Table 6), recall followed by correct source identification was numerically higher 
for high frequency words than low frequency words (the difference was also .07), whereas the 
difference in recall followed by incorrect source identification between high and low frequency 
words was numerically lower (the difference was also .02).  Notice that this trend was not 
observed with confidence ratings and, as before, none of them were statistically reliable.   
In free recall, Gregg, Montgomery, and Castaño (1980) have shown that recall accuracy 
is different between high and low frequency words in pure lists designs (i.e., when subjects study 
either a list composed of only low frequency words or a list composed of only high frequency 
words), but not in mixed lists designs (see also May &Tryk, 1970).  This result is clearly at odds 
with the findings from the current study, as subjects studied mixed rather than pure lists and 
produced reliable word frequency effects.  However, there are several important methodological 
differences between the two experiments that might elucidate why they produced different 
results.  First, list length differed between the two studies.  In Gregg et al.’s experiments, 
subjects studied lists composed of 12 words, and in mixed lists, half were high frequency words 
and the other half, low frequency.  In comparison, I found reliable word frequency effects only 
with a list composed of 60 words (48 additional data points per subject and test trial), in which 
half of them were of high frequency and the other half of low frequency.  Low statistical power 
could then explain the null result in Gregg et al.’s study, but this is a weak explanation because 
in their experiment, absolute values go in the opposite direction and recall accuracy was reliably 
better for low rather than high frequency words when subjects’ attention was divided during 
study.  Interestingly, in the present study, recall of low frequency targets from the short list was 
numerically higher than recall of high frequency targets, a pattern that reversed as (a) list length 
increased and (b) subjects had additional opportunities to study and recall targets.  In mixed list 
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designs, Watkins, LeCompte, and Kim (2000) found that subjects do not show differences in 
recall between high and low frequency words when they are aware that they will perform a recall 
test after study, but recall accuracy is better for high than low frequency words when they are not 
aware that they will perform a recall test after study.  In light of this finding, Watkins et al. 
argued that, in mixed list designs, null and reversed word frequency effects in free recall are due 
to strategic study of the focal list that favors low over high frequency words in order to optimize 
recall.  In this same vein, one possible explanation for the findings reported in this study is that 
subjects rely ever less on such strategy as list length increases and as they have increasing 
numbers of opportunities to study and recall targets.   
Subjective and objective measures of dual processes in free recall 
Subjective reports of retrieval phenomenologies, such as remember/know judgments, and 
memory strength, such as confidence judgments, as well as objective measures of retrieval of 
contextual information, such as source judgments, have been widely used, at times 
interchangeably, to separate recollective from nonrecollective retrieval in memory experiments 
(Wais et al., 2008, 2010; Wilding & Rugg, 1996; Yonelinas, 1999; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995).  
In recognition, Yonelinas (2001) has shown that dual-process parameters estimated from 
remember/know judgments, the process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991), and ROC curves 
are positively and highly correlated with each other across experimental conditions.  In free 
recall, we compared remember/know, confidence, and source judgments against parameter 
estimates from the dual-recall model, which estimates recollective and nonrecollective recall 
from subjects’ performance rather than introspective judgments.  This is the first study to make 
such a comparison in free recall and, additionally, subjective and objective measures of dual 
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processes were compared at the individual level, which allowed for inter-subject variability in 
the efficiency of each retrieval process.    
Both subjective and objective measures of dual processes showed that free recall of items 
on the last trial was mainly supported by recollective retrieval.  Across measures and 
experimental conditions, recollective retrieval accounted for roughly 2/3 of the words recalled on 
the last trial.  This finding is consistent with Tulving’s (1985) seminal study, for instance, in 
which remember judgments accounted for the majority of the words freely recalled (see also 
Hamilton & Rajaram, 2003).  Nonetheless, subjective measures of dual processes 
(remember/know and confidence judgments) tended to over-estimate recollective recall relative 
to objective measures (source judgments and the dual-recall model).  On average, recollective 
retrieval measured with subjective methods accounted for 71% of the words recalled on the last 
test, while recollective retrieval measured with objective methods accounted for 61%.  Such 
differences increased as list length decreased and were particularly higher between the dual-
recall model and subjective measures of recollective retrieval.   
The idea that subjective measures of dual processes over-estimate recollective retrieval in 
comparison to objective ones is predicted by the concept of noncriterial recollection (Yonelinas 
& Jacoby, 1996).  During test, subjects at times recollect information associated with a target 
(e.g., “I remember thinking of Isaac Newton when I saw the words apple and tree”; “I felt 
disgusted after seeing the word rotten”) that provide a basis for making remember judgments or 
changing one’s confidence about the recalled item.  Nevertheless, the same information might be 
neither diagnostic of the target’s occupancy in the recollective state L nor relevant to making 
correct identification of the target’s color.  Conversely, all information that provides a basis for 
objective measures of recollective retrieval also support subjective measures of it and, therefore, 
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subjective measures of recollective retrieval will tend to over-estimate recollective retrieval, 
relative to objective ones.  This pattern was indeed observed both at the group and at the 
individual levels when comparing the dual-recall model against retrospective judgments about 
memory (see Figures 5 and 6).   
In Figure 6, the dashed line represents the identity line, or perfect calibration, whereas the 
solid line represents the linear function that best fits the data.  Only recall followed by correct 
source identification and recall followed by remember judgment were reliable predictors of the 
proportion of targets in the recollective state L.  In particular, for remember judgments, 
calibration was best in subjects whose proportion of items in the recollective state L was higher 
than .20 (all subjects whose proportion of items in the recollective state L was below .20 over-
estimated recollective recall).  Indeed, recall followed by remember judgments was a better 
predictor of recollective retrieval parameters than recall followed by correct source identification.  
Source identification, however, does not always require item memory (Brainerd et al., 2012; 
Starns et al., 2008), and although source accuracy was above chance, subjects could have made 
correct source identifications based on guessing, as they were required to choose one of the two 
possible sources even in the absence of a vivid recollection of the target’s color.  In fact, when 
the source data was corrected for random guessing (see Appendix 4), none of the source 
measures predicted the parameters of the dual-recall model.  Nonetheless, contrary to correct 
source identification, the recollective phenomenology that characterizes remember judgments 
was not a distinctive feature of direct access of targets’ verbatim traces, as subjects also 
attributed it to targets reconstructed from partial information (see Table 7).  However, subjects’ 
ability to identify nonrecollective retrieval when it occurs in free recall was noticeably weaker 
than their ability to identify recollective retrieval.  Specifically, recall followed by either 
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incorrect source identification, or know/guess responses, or low confidence was not a reliable 
predictor of nonrecollective recall.   
Is confidence a proxy of memory strength in free recall? 
The idea that subjects can consciously monitor the memory strength of recalled items was 
not supported by the findings reported in this study.  I compared the effects of output position on 
two proxies of memory strength, one objective (MTE) and another subjective (retrospective 
confidence).  Prior studies have shown that MTE shows a non-monotonic relationship with 
output position in free recall tasks (a U-shaped curve across output positions).  This relationship, 
called the cognitive triage effect (Brainerd et al., 1991), contradicts our intuition that items are 
output in a strong → weak fashion.  One hypothesis is that subjects are aware of such triage 
process and, therefore, are able to assign confidence judgments accordingly whenever cognitive 
triage effects are observed.  This hypothesis, however, was not supported by the results of this 
study.  In fact, whereas the objective measure indicated that memory strength increased from 
earlier to later output positions in the short list condition (MTE decreased), the subjective 
measure indicated that memory strength decreased from earlier to later output positions in the 
same condition (confidence decreased).  In other words, confidence judgments were consistent 
with our mistaken intuition about how memory strength is distributed across output positions in 
free recall.  Indeed, the correlation between mean confidence rating and the MTE was low and 
unreliable.  In the short, medium, and long list length conditions, the correlation between 
confidence rating and MTE was .11, .13, and .18, respectively.  In addition, whereas subjective 
memory strength showed strong output dependencies (see Appendix 5 for more details), 
objective memory strength did not, which further suggests that confidence is not sampled 
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directly from memory strength in free recall but it is also influenced by prior responses and our 
intuitions about how targets are recalled in a free recall task. 
Conclusion 
List length and word frequency effects have long been target of investigation (e.g., Strong, 
1912) and have traditionally played a critical role in the development of memory theories and 
models.  In free recall, the findings reported in this study indicate that both recollective and 
nonrecollective processes are influenced by list length.  Specifically, as list length decreases, 
direct access of targets’ verbatim traces increases as well as reconstruction from partial 
information.  In addition, list length also affects learning via nonrecollective processes—as 
subjects received additional opportunities to study and recall the targets from a focal list, 
reconstructed targets from short and medium lists become ever more prone to be output, but not 
targets from long lists.  When word frequency was manipulated within-subjects, it produced 
small but reliable effects in recollective recall that increased as a function of test trial.  However, 
such effects were restricted to long lists, in which high frequency words facilitated direct access 
in comparison to low frequency words.   
The comparison between the dual-recall model and retrospective judgments about 
memory revealed four main results.  First, direct access of targets’ verbatim traces correlated 
positively with the proportion of recalled targets that received remember rather than know/guess 
judgments, and additionally, it correlated with the proportion of recalled targets whose source 
(color) were correctly identified rather than incorrectly identified.  Remember judgments also 
correlated with reconstruction, indicating that items reconstructed from partial information can at 
times produce recollective phenomenology, although to a lesser degree than items directly 
accessed.  Second, as a method of separating recollective from nonrecollective retrieval, 
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retrospective confidence did not show any reliable correlations with statistics from the dual-
recall model.  Third, as a proxy for memory strength, retrospective confidence was unrelated to 
an objective measure of memory strength (items’ history of recall across trials) and conformed to 
people’s intuition about how memory strength is distributed across output position in free recall 
protocols (strong → weak), even though analysis of objective strength indicated that such 
intuition was mistaken (targets were output in a weak → strong fashion).  Lastly, across output 
position, confidence ratings made to items output later in the free recall protocol were largely 
influenced by ratings made to items output earlier (output dependencies), and a similar pattern, 
although less prominent, was observed with the proportion of remember judgments made to 
recalled items (see Appendix 5 for details).  The findings indicate that confidence ratings should 
not be regarded as direct measures of either memory strength or dual processes in free recall, and 
importantly, at least in free recall, subjects are better able to monitor the episodic state of targets 
in a recollective state rather than targets in a nonrecollective state—in fact, there was no 
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1. When type of metacognitive judgment was included in the ANOVA with proportion of 
correctly recalled words as dependent variable, it neither produced a reliable main effect, F(2, 92) 
= 1.76, nor interacted with the other factors, Fs ≤ 1.58.  For such reason, we omitted it from the 
previous ANOVA. 
2. Correct source identification can be due to guessing as well and, therefore, the 
proportion of recalled words whose source was correctly identified is a biased measure of 
recollection.  Alternatively, one might compute an unbiased measure of recollection with source 
data as follows.  This procedure is describe in detail in Appendix 4, and summarized here.  Let 
P(S) and P(G) refer to the probability of source retrieval and correctly guessing a target’s source, 
respectively, then the unbiased measure of the proportion of recalled words whose source was 
correctly identified is the following joint probability: P(Recall and source retrieval) = [P(Recall 
and correct source) – P(Recall) × P(G)] / [1 – P(G)], in which both P(Recall) and P(Recall and 
correct source) can be estimated from subjects’ data.  For an experiment with N different sources, 
and assuming that subjects guess randomly, P(G) = 1 / N, and then, P(Recall and source retrieval) 
= [N × P(Recall and correct source) – P(Recall)] / (N – 1), and similarly, source retrieval can be 
estimated as P(S) = [N × P(Recall and source retrieval) – P(Recall)] / [(N – 1) × P(Recall)].  In 
the present study, N = 2, as subjects had to decide between either red or blue colors.  Notice that 
this procedure for computing an unbiased estimate of recollection from source data needs to 
assume that source retrieval only occurs for recalled items.  In other words, as in Batchelder & 
Riefer, 1990, source memory depends on item memory—if subjects are not able to recall a target, 
then the implication is that they will not be able to recall the target’s source.  Such assumption, 
although very intuitive, does not always hold (Brainerd et al., 2012; Starns et al., 2008).  In 
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addition, it assumes that guessing is always aleatory—situations in which subjects guessed red or 
blue due to some strategy (e.g., “I think that most recalled words were red, so I will guess red if I 
cannot remember the actual color”) were not taken into account.  All statistical analyses with 
such measures are presented in Appendix 4. 
3. Because the confidence scale was bipolar, one might measure recollective retrieval as 
the proportion of recalled words that received ratings 5 (+ +) or 4 (+).  The analysis using such 
separation method was reported in Appendix 6. 
4. However, the unbiased measure of recollection from source data, the joint probability 
P(Recall and source retrieval), under-estimated recollection in all conditions (see Appendix 4 




Dual-Recall Markov Chain 
In a multiple-trial experiment in which subjects receive 3 study-test trials of form S1T1 
S2T2 S3T3, each target (studied item) generates one out of eight possible patterns of correct (C) 
and error (E) responses across tests, namely C1C2C3, C1C2E3, …, E1E2E3.  The 6 parameters 
presented in Table 1 can be estimated from the frequency of such error-success patterns by 
applying a dual-recall Markov chain that contains those parameters.  The states of the model are 
U (an initial no-recall state), P (an intermediate partial-recall state), with a correct recall state PC 
and an incorrect recall state PE, and L (a terminal and absorbing criterion-recall state).  The 
Markov process for these states consists of the following starting vector W and transition 
matrices M1 and M2:  
 W = [L(1), PE(1), PC(1), U(1)] = [D1, (1-D1)R(1-J1), (1-D1)RJ1, (1-D1)(1-R)],  (A1) 
  L(2) PE(2) PC(2) U(2)  
L(1) 1 0 0 0 
PE(1) D2 (1-D2)(1-J2) (1-D2)J2 0 
PC(1) 0 (1-J2) J2 0 
M1 = 
U(1) D2 (1-D2)R(1-J2) (1-D2)RJ2 (1-D2)(1-R) 




L(3) PE(3) PC(3) U(3) 
 
L(2) 1 0 0 0 
PE(2) D2 (1-D2)(1-J3) (1-D2)J3 0 
PC(2) 0 (1-J3) J3 0 
M2 = 
U(2) D2 (1-D2)R (1-J3) (1-D2)RJ3 (1-D2)(1-R) 




The probabilities of the 8 individual error-success patterns are obtained by multiplying 
the starting vector and transition matrices together. Those expressions are: 
P(C1C2C3) = D1 + (1-D1)RJ1J2J3;        (A4) 
P(C1C2E3) = (1-D1)RJ1J2(1-J3);        (A5) 
P(C1E2C3) = (1-D1)RJ1(1-J2)D2 + (1-D1)RJ1(1-J2)(1-D2)J3;     (A6) 
P(C1E2E3) = (1-D1)RJ1(1-J2)(1-D2)(1-J3) ;       (A7) 
P(E1C2C3) = (1-D1)R(1-J1)D2 + (1-D1)R(1-J1)(1-D2)J2J3  
   + (1-D1)(1-R)D2 + (1-D1)(1-R)(1-D2)RJ2J3;     (A8) 
P(E1C2E3) = (1-D1)R(1-J1)(1-D2)J2(1-J3) + (1-D1)(1-R)(1-D2)RJ2(1-J3);   (A9) 
P(E1E2C3) = (1-D1)R(1-J1)(1-D2)(1-J2)D2 + (1-D1)R(1-J1)(1-D2)(1-J2)(1-D2)J3  
   + (1-D1)(1-R)(1-D2)R(1-J2)D2 + (1-D1)(1-R)(1-D2)R(1-J2)(1-D2)J3  
   + (1-D1)(1-R)(1-D2)(1-R)D2 + (1-D1)(1-R)(1-D2)(1-R)(1-D2)RJ3;  (A10) 
P(E1E2E3) = (1-D1)R(1-J1)(1-D2)(1-J2)(1-D2)(1-J3)  
   + (1-D1)(1-R)(1-D2)R(1-J2)(1-D2)(1-J3)  
   + (1-D1)(1-R)(1-D2)(1-R)(1-D2)R(1-J3)  
   + (1-D1)(1-R)(1-D2)(1-R)(1-D2)(1-R).     (A11) 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the 6 parameters in Table 1 are then obtained by 
maximizing the following likelihood function using any optimization procedure:  
L6 = Π(pi)N(i),           (A12) 
in which the pi are the 8 expressions on the right sides of Equations A4–A11, and the N(i) are 
empirical data counts of the corresponding error-success sequences.  Because 6 free parameters 
are estimated, the likelihood value in A12 is computed with 1 degree of freedom.  A goodness-
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of-fit test that evaluates the null hypothesis that learning to recall involves two processes is then 
obtained by computing a likelihood ratio statistic that compares the likelihood in A12 to the 
likelihood of the same data when all 7 observable probabilities are free to vary.  That test statistic, 
which is asymptotically distributed as χ2(1), is  
G2 = -2ln[L6 / L7],           (A13) 







Short list (16 words) 
High-frequency words.  Club, hand, hospital, letter, lettuce, material, point, and race. 
Low-frequency words.  Apricot, cider, fable, heroin, jade, mutiny, pier, and tomahawk. 
Medium list (30 words) 
High-frequency words.  Audience, black, children, court, figure, hall, hotel, mouth, note, 
picture, plant, pudding, school, town, and write. 
Low-frequency words.  Cavern, damsel, fawn, galaxy, glacier, hostage, hump, lice, 
monarch, napkin, noose, soot, spike, streamer, and walrus. 
Long list (60 words) 
High-frequency words.  Building, case, color, degree, doctor, eight, family, floor, food, 
friend, human, market, money, paper, party, person, plane, president, pretty, room, secretary, 
sound, space, spring, staff, station, table, wall, white, and woman. 
Low-frequency words.  Blacksmith, boar, bristle, brook, cedar, clam, cloak, crook, crypt, 
dandelion, feast, filth, fowl, ginger, grocer, knob, loot, magnet, morphine, parcel, pliers, podium, 







Instructions to Make Retrospective Judgments 
Remember/know/guess judgments 
“All the words you recalled on the LAST test will be presented with you in the same 
order as you recalled them.  For each word, you will be asked to make a "REMEMBER", 
"KNOW", or "GUESS" judgment.  Make a REMEMBER judgment (press "r") if you are able to 
bring back to mind a particular association, image, or something more personal from the time of 
study, or what the word looked like, such as its color, or sounded like when you read it to 
yourself during study.  Make a KNOW judgment (press "k") if you have a feeling that you saw 
the word during study, but you are unable to bring back to mind any qualitative information 
about it.  For example, if someone asks for your name, you would typically respond in the 
“know” sense without becoming consciously aware of anything about a particular event or 
experience. However, when asked about the last movie you saw, you would typically respond in 
the “remember” sense, that is, becoming consciously aware again of some aspects of the 
experience (e.g., the room and who you were with).  Make a GUESS judgment (press "g") if you 
simply guessed the word during recall.” 
Confidence judgments 
“All the words you recalled on the LAST test will be presented with you in the same 
order as you recalled them.  For each word, you will be asked to make a CONFIDENCE 
judgment on a scale ranging from 1 to 6 as follows: 
1 = VERY confident that the recalled word WAS NOT studied; 
2 = MODERATELY confident that the recalled word WAS NOT studied; 
3 = A LITTLE BIT confident that the recalled word WAS NOT studied; 
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4 = A LITTLE BIT confident that the recalled word WAS studied; 
5 = MODERATELY confident that the recalled word WAS studied; 
6 = VERY confident that the recalled word WAS studied. 
Please be extremely cautious about using the end points of 1 and 6 and use them only if 
you are 100% positive about your answer. If you use 1 or 6, that means you cannot possibly 
make a mistake. That is, you are so confident in your answer that you would be willing to testify 
in a court of law, even in a life-or-death situation.” 
Source judgments 
“All the words you recalled on the LAST test will be presented with you in the same 
order as you recalled them.  For each word, you will be asked to make a SOURCE judgment. 
During the study phases, the words were presented in either RED or BLUE.  Make a RED 
judgment (press "r") if the recalled word was presented in red during the study phases.  Make a 





Additional Analyses of the Source Judgments Data 
Correct source identifications can be made via source retrieval and guessing.  Consequently, 
the proportion of recalled words whose source was correctly identified, P(Rc ˄ Cs), is a biased 
measure of recollection.  In this section I present alternative measures that separate source 
retrieval from guessing.  Let P(S) and P(G) be the probability of source retrieval and correctly 
guessing a target’s source, respectively, which are jointly independent events.  Then, the 
unbiased measure of the proportion of recalled words whose source was correctly identified is 
the joint probability of correct recall and source retrieval, P(Rc ˄ S), which can be expressed in 
terms of P(S), P(G), and two known measures, namely the probability of correct recall, P(Rc), 
and the joint probability of correct recall and correct source identification, P(Rc ˄ Cs), as follows: 
P(Rc ˄ S) = [P(Rc ˄ Cs) – P(Rc) × P(G)] / [1 – P(G)].      (A14)   
In an experiment with N distinct sources, one might assume that subjects randomly guess 
the source of recalled targets when source retrieval fails, and thus, P(G) = 1 / N.  The revised 
Equation A14, 
P(Rc ˄ S) = [N × P(Rc ˄ Cs) – P(Rc)] / (N – 1),      (A15) 
provides unbiased estimates of recollective retrieval from source data.  Similarly, source retrieval, 
P(S), can be estimated from known measures as follows, 
P(S) = [N × P(Rc ˄ S) – P(Rc)] / [(N – 1) × P(Rc)] 
        = {N × [[N × P(Rc ˄ Cs) – P(Rc)] / (N – 1)] – P(Rc)} / [(N – 1) × P(Rc)] 
        = [N² × P(Rc ˄ Cs) – (2N – 1) × P(Rc)] / [(N – 1)² × P(Rc)].    (A16) 
Correct identification of a target’s source due to random guessing becomes an ever more 
infrequent event as N → ∞ and, therefore, lim N→∞ P(Rc ˄ S) = P(Rc ˄ Cs) and lim N→∞ P(S) = 
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P(Rc ˄ Cs) / P(Rc).  In the present study, however, N = 2, which leads to the following 
simplified versions of Equations A15 and A16, respectively, 
P(Rc ˄ S) = 2P(Rc ˄ Cs) – P(Rc),        (A17) 
P(S) = P(Rc ˄ S) / P(Rc).         (A18) 
When these statistics were computed for the present experiment (see Table 8), they 
revealed a very similar pattern to the unadjusted source accuracy data (cf. Tables 6 and 8).  P(S), 
as source accuracy, did not show reliable effects of list length and word frequency, Fs ≤ 2.04.  
P(Rc ˄ S), however, showed reliable effects of list length and word frequency when P(Rc ˄ S) 
and the joint probability of correct recall and incorrect source identification, P(Rc ˄ I), were 
submitted to a 3 (list length: short, medium, long) x 2 (word frequency: low, high) x 2 (source 
accuracy: P(Rc ˄ S), P(Rc ˄ I)) repeated measures ANOVA.  Specifically, the ANOVA 
produced a main effect of list length, F(2, 76) = 41.6, MSE = .01, η²p = .52, and an interaction 
between list length and word frequency, F(2, 76) = 5.36, MSE = .01, η²p = .12.  The latter 
interaction indicated that, on average, both P(Rc ˄ S) and P(Rc ˄ I) were higher for high 
frequency words than low frequency words, but such effect was only reliable in the long list 
length condition.  
However, contrary to the P(Rc ˄ Cs) measure of recollection shown in Figures 5 and 6, 
P(Rc ˄ S) greatly under-estimated recollective recall, relative to all other measurement methods 
(cf. Figure 5 and Table 8).  In addition, at the level of individuals, the correlations shown in 
Table 9 indicate that none of the additional source measures, namely P(S), P(Rc ˄ S), and P(Rc 




Analysis of Output Dependency 
Because vincentised output positions partition subjects’ free recall protocol into four 
parts, they allow an investigation of whether measurements of items output earlier in the free 
recall protocol (e.g., VO1) are associated with measurements of items output later in the free 
recall protocol (e.g., VO4).  Specifically, for each list length condition (short, medium, and long), 
I computed all 6 possible correlations between vincentised output positions, namely rVOi,VOj, for i 
≠ j and i,j = {1, .., 4}, using each of the following type of measure of items output on the last trial: 
MTE, mean confidence ratings, mean proportion of remember responses, and mean source 
accuracy.  Reliable output dependencies (the mean of all rs) indicate that the measure of items 
output earlier in the free recall protocol can predict the measure of subsequent items.  In the case 
of retrospective judgments, for example, reliable output dependencies might suggest that subjects 
rely on previous judgments, rather than introspection, to make new judgments.  The results are 
shown in Figure 11, in which mean output dependencies are plotted as a function of both list 
length and type of measure.  Retrospective metacognitive judgments (remember and confidence 
judgments) showed reliable output dependencies that interacted with list length.  Specifically, for 
both remember and confidence judgments, output dependencies increased as list length increased.  
Nonetheless, on average, output dependencies were higher for confidence judgments (.69) than 
for remember judgments (.39), and both source accuracy (.21) and MTE (.02) did not show 
reliable output dependencies.   
Therefore, the results of the analysis of output dependencies revealed differences among 
the three types of retrospective judgments.  Subjects’ confidence ratings, in particular, were 
highly correlated across output positions.  In fact, confidence judgments made to items output 
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earlier in the free recall protocol accounted for roughly half (48%) of the confidence judgments 
made to items output later.  This suggests, for instance, that if subjects are very confident about 
the items output in the beginning of the free recall protocol, they will tend to be very confident 
about the items output later on as well, regardless of underlying retrieval processes and whether 
items output later are associated to weak or strong memory traces.  Although to a lesser degree, 
this results was also observed with the proportion of remember judgments made to recalled 
targets.  Specifically, the proportion of remember judgments made to items output earlier in the 
free recall protocol accounted for 15% of the proportion of remember judgments made to items 
output later.  In addition, for both confidence and remember judgments, output dependencies 
increased as the number of studied items increased.  This suggests that, as the number of to-be-
recalled items increases, subjects rely ever less on introspections, and more on prior judgments, 
to make both confidence and remember/know judgments to items recalled latter in free recall 
protocols, which represents an obvious challenge to the use of such judgments as methods of 






Additional Analyses of Confidence Judgments 
The decomposition of recall into its recollective and nonrecollective components via 
confidence judgments can be made by assuming that the highest confidence level that the item 
was studied (6, or +++) signals the recollective form of retrieval, while lower confidence levels 
that the item was studied (5 and 4, or ++ and +) signal nonrecollective retrieval.  This separation 
method differs from the one previously reported in that nonrecollective retrieval does not include 
confidence ratings lower than 4, namely judgments that the recalled item was not studied.  
Nonetheless, the results were very similar to the ones previously reported.  A 3 (list length: short, 
medium, long) x 2 (word frequency: low, high) x 2 (type of process: recollective, nonrecollective) 
revealed a main effect of type of process, F(1, 27) = 12.6, MSE = .20, η²p = .32, list length, F(2, 
54) = 47.2, MSE = .01, η²p = .64, word frequency, F(1, 27) = 14.3, MSE = .01, η²p = .35, and 
small but reliable interactions between type of process and list length, F(2, 54) = 3.6, MSE = .03, 
η²p = .12, and type of process and word frequency, F(2, 54) = 4.6, MSE = .01, η²p = .14.  The 
interaction between type of process and list length indicated that the effects of list length on 
recollective retrieval (max confidence) were larger than on nonrecollective retrieval (lower 
confidence), whereas the interaction between type of process and word frequency indicated that 
only recollective retrieval differed between low- and high-frequency words.  As before, however, 
this method of measuring dual processes in free recall also overestimated recollective retrieval, 
and thus to underestimated nonrecollective retrieval, relative to the dual-retrieval model.  In 
addition, analysis of individual data did not reveal any reliable correlation between statistics 
from the dual-retrieval model and confidence judgments (|rs| ≤ .35), as the ones reported in Table 




Parameters of the Dual-Recall Model 
Parameter   State   Definition 
Recollective retrieval 
Direct access     





The probability that an item’s verbatim trace can be accessed after the second or third study trials 
if it could not be accessed following the first study trial. 
Nonrecollective retrieval 





The probability that an item can be reconstructed from partially identifying information after any 
study trial if it can neither be directly accessed nor reconstructed following prior study trials. 





The probability that a reconstructed item is judged familiar to be output following the first study 
trial. 
















Mean Recall Accuracy Measures as a Function of Word Frequency and List Length 
    Proportion recalled     
Condition   T1 T2 T3   MTR 
High frequency       
Short list  .35 (.22) .68 (.23) .78 (.19)  1.80 (.55) 
Medium list  .28 (.18) .48 (.20) .63 (.21)  1.37 (.52) 
Long list  .21 (.11) .40 (.15) .51 (.18)  1.13 (.40) 
Low frequency       
Short list  .41 (.17) .69 (.19) .76 (.17)  1.86 (.44) 
Medium list  .28 (.17) .49 (.21) .61 (.21)  1.38 (.51) 
Long list   .16 (.08) .32 (.15) .43 (.17)   .91 (.36) 







Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Parameters of the Dual-Recall Model as a Function of 
Experimental Conditions 
    Recollective retrieval   Nonrecollective retrieval 
Condition   D1 D2 Mean D   R J1 J2 J3 Mean J 
High frequency           
Short list  .23 .22 .23   .39 .38 .75 .73 .62 
Medium list  .15 .18 .17   .24 .49 .59 .65 .57 
Long list  .12 .18 .15   .17 .59 .54 .47 .54 
Low frequency           
Short list  .20 .18 .19   .49 .52 .73 .70 .65 
Medium list  .15 .14 .15   .29 .51 .64 .63 .59 





Mean Proportion Recalled on the Last Trial that Received “Remember” or “Know” Judgments as a 
Function of Experimental Conditions 
Condition   Remember Know 
High frequency    
Short list  .57 (.23) .21 (.20) 
Medium list  .48 (.28) .16 (.15) 
Long list  .40 (.22) .14 (.10) 
Low frequency    
Short list  .56 (.23) .20 (.17) 
Medium list  .50 (.23) .13 (.13) 
Long list   .33 (.16) .12 (.10) 






Mean Confidence Measures as a Function of Experimental Conditions 
    Proportion recalled per confidence rating 
Condition   
Confidence 
rating + + + (6) + + (5) + (4) - (3) - - (2) - - - (1) 
High frequency         
Short list  5.56 (.66) .57 (.34) .17 (.23) .06 (.12) .01 (.05) .01 (.03) .00 (.00) 
Medium list  5.54 (.54) .46 (.29) .15 (.20) .04 (.10) .01 (.02) .00 (.00) .00 (.03) 
Long list  5.54 (.59) .34 (.24) .11 (.16) .03 (.05) .01 (.02) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) 
Low frequency         
Short list  5.57 (.70) .56 (.33) .14 (.23) .03 (.09) .00 (.02) .02 (.07) .00 (.02) 
Medium list  5.70 (.50) .49 (.30) .10 (.18) .02 (.05) .00 (.01) .00 (.00) .00 (.03) 
Long list   5.54 (.69) .31 (.22) .09 (.14) .02 (.04) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) 






Mean Source Accuracy Measures as a Function of Experimental Conditions 
    Proportion recalled per source accuracy 
Condition   
Source 
accuracy Correct source Incorrect source 
High frequency     
Short list  .64 (.25) .46 (.22) .28 (.21) 
Medium list  .65 (.19) .40 (.19) .21 (.13) 
Long list  .60 (.16) .31 (.14) .20 (.09) 
Low frequency     
Short list  .67 (.25) .52 (.22) .24 (.16) 
Medium list  .64 (.19) .37 (.15) .21 (.14) 
Long list   .59 (.17) .24 (.10) .18 (.09) 





Correlations between Individualized Statistics of the Dual-Recall Model and Retrospective Measures of 
Dual Processes across all Experimental Conditions 
    Remember/Know   Confidence   Source 
Dual-recall model   Recollective Nonrecollective   Recollective Nonrecollective   Recollective Nonrecollective 
Parameters          
D1  .65* .11  .22 .16  .52* .21 
D2  .56* -.05  .21 .07  .39* .28 
Mean D  .62* .01  .25 .12  .49* .27 
R  .49* .18  .23 .33  .30 .30 
J1  -.54* .13  .13 -.34  -.08 -.20 
J2  -.32 .20  .17 -.09  .18 -.12 
J3  -.19 .30  .20 .17  .15 -.02 
Mean J  -.42* .26  .20 -.09  .10 -.14 
Recall on T3          
Recollective  .57* -.05  .19 .10  .40* .26 
Nonrecollective   -.08 .09   .28 .06   .11 .05 
Note. The definition of recollective and nonrecollective retrieval for each type of retrospective judgment was the same 
as the one used to generate Figure 5 (joint probabilities) and runs as follows.  For remember/know judgments, 
recollective retrieval was the proportion of recalled words that received a “remember” judgment, and nonrecollective 
retrieval was the proportion of recalled words that received either a “know” or “guess” judgment.  For confidence 
ratings, recollective retrieval was the proportion of recalled words that received the maximum confidence rating, while 
nonrecollective retrieval was the proportion of recalled words that received confidence ratings lower than the 
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maximum.  For source accuracy, recollective retrieval was the proportion of recalled words whose source was correctly 
identified, while nonrecollective retrieval was the proportion of recalled words whose source was incorrectly identified. 





Additional Mean Source Accuracy Measures as a Function of Experimental Conditions 
Condition   P(S) P(G)* P(Rc and S) 
P(Rc and G) 
= P(Rc and I) 
High frequency      
Short list  .28 (.49) 0.5 .19 (.37) .28 (.21) 
Medium list  .31 (.27) 0.5 .20 (.25) .21 (.13) 
Long list  .19 (.32) 0.5 .10 (.17) .20 (.09) 
Low frequency      
Short list  .34 (.49) 0.5 .29 (.35) .24 (.16) 
Medium list  .27 (.38) 0.5 .15 (.22) .21 (.14) 
Long list   .17 (.34) 0.5 .06 (.13) .18 (.09) 
Note. P(S) = Probability of source retrieval, P(G) = Probability of 
guessing the correct source when source retrieval fails, P(Rc and S) = 
Joint probability of recall and source retrieval, P(Rc and G) = Joint 
probability of recall and guessing the correct source when source 
retrieval fails, and P(Rc and I) = Joint probability of recall and incorrect 
source identification.  P(Rc and G) = P(Rc and I) because G = 1/2.  





Correlations between Individualized Statistics of the Dual-Recall Model and Additional Source 
Measures 
  Source measures 
Dual-recall model   P(S) P(Rc and S) 
P(Rc and G) = 
P(Rc and I) 
Parameters     
D1  .15 .30 .21 
D2  .03 .16 .28 
R  -.07 .08 .30 
J1  .10 .04 -.20 
J2  .22 .21 -.12 
J3  .10 .13 -.02 
Recall on T3     
Recollective  .04 .18 .26 
Nonrecollective   .03 .07 .05 
Note. P(S) = Probability of source retrieval, P(G) = Probability of 
guessing the correct source when source retrieval fails, P(Rc and S) = 
Joint probability of recall and source retrieval, P(Rc and G) = Joint 
probability of recall and guessing the correct source when source 
retrieval fails, and P(Rc and I) = Joint probability of recall and 





















Figure 1. Actual and predicted recall as a function of time (in quartiles) to output answers to general 


















Figure 2. Hypothetical relationship between an item’s output position and its memory strength.  The 
figure illustrates the cognitive triage effect that items are output in a weak → strong → weak fashion 





















































Figure 3.  Hypothetical relationship between confidence (6 = Very confident that the item was 
studied, ..., 4 = A little bit confident that the item was studied, 3 = A little bit confident that the item was 
not studied, ..., 1 = Very confident that the item was not studied) and the mean total number of errors on 
previous tests (MTE) for items recalled after 3 recall tests.  Panel A illustrates the hypothesis that 
subjects cannot monitor the distribution of the strength of memory traces across output position (weak 
→ strong → weak), measured via the MTE statistic, and rely on beliefs about how memory strength is 
distributed across output position (strong → weak) to make confidence judgments.  Panel B illustrates 
the hypothesis that subjects can monitor the distribution of the strength of memory traces across output 
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position (weak → strong → weak) and, therefore, they make confidence judgments across output 




















Recollection = .27 
Familiarity (d' ) = 2.0 
 
Figure 4.  Hypothetical receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. + signs indicate confidence levels 
that a test probe was studied and – signs indicate confidence levels that a test probe was not studied.  
The estimates of recollection (intercept of the ROC curve) and familiarity (deflection of the ROC curve) 
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Figure 5.  The proportion of correctly recalled items on the last trial as a function of list length and four 
methods of separating recollective retrieval from nonrecollective retrieval, namely the dual-recall model 







Figure 6.  Correlations between recall in the recollective state L on the last trial, as measured by the dual-recall model, and the following three 
retrospective measures of recollective retrieval: recall followed by either remember judgments (Panel A), or correct source identification (Panel B), or 
maximum confidence (Panel C).  The dashed line is the identity (perfect calibration).  The solid line is the linear function that best describes the 
relationship between the two variables.  In Panel A, the linear function explains 33% of the variability.  In Panel B, the linear function explains 16% of the 


















Figure 7.  Mean total number of errors (MTE) of items recalled on trial 3 as a function of list length and 
































Figure 8.  Mean confidence ratings for items recalled on trial 3 as a function of list length and 

































Figure 9.  Mean proportion of remember judgments for items recalled on trial 3 as a function of list 





































































Figure 11.  Output dependencies as a function of list length and type of measure for items recalled on 
trial 3.  Asterisks indicate reliable output dependencies.  
 
